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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explains why in the 1940s, Winnipeg meat 
packing workers secured sustainable industrial unionism. By 
tracing the development of the Winnipeg meat packing industry 
and investigating previously unsuccessful organizational 
drives, it is suggested that success in the 1940s corresponded 
to three broad contributing factors. 
The most significant factor was changing local 
conditions. With the gradual introduction of mass production 
techniques to the Winnipeg meat packing industry beginning in 
the early 1920s, the reorganization of Winnipeg packinghouse 
work occurred. The large scale introduction of semi-skilled 
workers changed the face of meat packing, as packinghouse 
work became deskilled without any significant degree of 
automation. 
During this period, craft unionism in the meat packing 
industry failed on a national pattern. This failure coincided 
with the 1930s experiment in industrial unionism by Winnipeg 
workers at Western Packers workers. Western Packing's 
workers' introduction to industrial unionism also provided the 
successful 1940s drive with links to the Communist Party. 
An overall strengthening in North America of the labour 
movement beginning in the 1930s provided the second broad 
contributing factor to success in the 1940s. With the birth 
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of the CIO in the United States and Canada, Winnipeg meat 
packing workers gained at the very minimum inspiration. 
The impact of World War II accounted for the final 
contributing factor for success in the 1940s. With a wartime 
demand creating full employment and the government's desire to 
maintain production, organized labour found itself in a 
position of unparalleled power. In combination, a spirit of 
militancy arose among Canada's labour movement. 
From these conditions, meat packing workers in Winnipeg 
chose and pursued industrial unionism with great success. By 
the end of World War II, workers in Winnipeg possessed an 
effective union organization and had won union shops and wage 
increases. Ultimately however, the union's national success 
created a centralized, bureaucratic union movement which 
consequently provided a loss of local autonomy. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Despite previous attempts, on the eve of World War II, 
unionism and collective bargaining did not exist in Winnipeg's 
meat packing industry. As working conditions began to change 
in the 1930s, Winnipeg meat packing workers at Western Packing 
first attempted to organize industrially. Although the 
ensuing, long - and often violent - Western Packing strike 
failed to introduce industrial unionism to the industry's 
workers, the seeds and avenue to worker empowerment were 
planted. 
With the onset of World War II, packinghouse workers at 
Canada Packers rose and organized themselves as a local 
chapter of the united Packinghouse Workers of America. 
Following a highly successful one-day sitdown strike in 1943, 
industry leader Canada Packers grudgingly recognized the local 
and began the process towards collective bargaining. With the 
pillar of the anti-union industry seriously shaken, organizing 
activities and union recognition spread with great success to 
the remainder of the Winnipeg industry within a year. By the 
end of the War, less than two years later, the vast majority 
of Winnipeg packinghouse workers held union recognition and 
collective agreements. 
Winnipeg's status within the Canadian meat packing 
industry during this era was renowned for two main reasons. 
The Winnipeg industry held claim to being Western Canada's 
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largest meat packing centre, and ranked second in terms of 
national importance. secondly, the industry and the city were 
infamous for a long tradition of anti-unionist policies. 
Attempts to organize · Winnipeg meat packing workers 
historically had been met with fierce resistance and 
hostility. From the time that industrial unionism emerged in 
1934 as the sole logical approach to empower meat packing 
workers, it required only nine years until Winnipeg workers 
organized and won recognition. This thesis investigates why 
it took until the 1940s before workers in Winnipeg's 
packinghouses developed sustainable industrial unionism. 
During the 1930s and early 1940s, strong external forces 
exerted influence on the re-introduction of industrial 
unionism in Winnipeg's meat packing industry. Throughout 
North America, this period experienced a reviving interest in 
trade unionism, as harsh economic times combined with a socio-
political climate favourable to a growing interest and belief 
in collective action. As organized labour gained economic 
power and social popularity, the outbreak of World War II led 
the Canadian state into an increasingly active role, which 
deepened as the War brought full employment. These conditions 
alone did not explain the successful attainment of industrial 
unionism in Winnipeg's meat packing industry. Rather, these 
events provided the background against which local conditions 
combined, and enabled Winnipeg workers to organize and win 
union recognition. 
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Among the most significant reasons for the success of the 
organizing drive of the 1940s was a change in local 
conditions. Meat packing established itself in Winnipeg in 
the late nineteenth century. As a growing market for meat 
products emerged in the early twentieth century, meat packing 
companies across Canada and the United States sought 
alternative ways to expand operations and maximize profits. 
In an era when many industries developed new technologies and 
replaced skilled workers with machines, the meat packing 
industry's nature prevented it from adopting such methods. As 
a result, meat packing's reorganization focused on work 
performed. 
With the 1925 construction of Winnipeg's Harris Abattoir 
plant, a new genre of meat packing plants emerged and a new 
philosophy of work introduced. Since meat packing could not 
mechanize extensively or replace jobs with machines - as many 
other industries did alternate modernizing approaches 
developed. With the construction of massive plants and the 
large-scale introduction of semi skilled labour, an 
alternative re-organization of work, exemplifying a new 
philosophy of mass production, occurred. Although not 
universal nor perfected for many years, profit-driven national 
firms deskilled traditional jobs and introduced mass 
production division of labour strategies instead of increasing 
automation. Work reorganization meant that each worker 
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performed only one or two cuts, allowing companies to reduce 
the need for expensive skilled labour. 
As Winnipeg.'s skilled butchers and meat cutters faced 
reorganization and .the introduction of mass production 
technologies to their industry, they attempted to unite in 
craft unions in order to protect themselves in face of the 
oncoming changes. The failure of meat packing's craft unions 
was swift and indicative of their declining fate. 
Paternalistic, anti-union companies and a diminishing 
bargaining voice doomed the skilled-based unions. By the 1925 
' 
creation of the new Winnipeg plant, craft unionism proved 
itself mortally ineffective and out-of-date in face of the 
ever-changing industry. 
As there were no independent forms of worker organization 
or representation, working conditions in Winnipeg's meat 
packing plants proved atrocious. In the late 1920s, semi 
skilled meat packing workers held no bargaining power and 
remained at the mercy of profit-driven management. Meat 
packing companies paid low wages in dangerous working 
conditions and subjected workers to long hours and irregular 
employment dictated by ruthless management. This scenario 
worsened with the onset of the Great Depression. 
With no assistance or leadership coming from traditional 
labour organizations, Winnipeg's packinghouse workers found 
leadership from the communist Party and its affiliated union 
the Winnipeg-based Food Workers Industrial Union. The 
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Canadian labour movement during the 1920s and early 1930s 
proved conservative and ineffective. In an economically 
depressed time when many industries modernized and altered 
their work struoture,and,labourforce, traditional organized 
labour movements like the Canadian Trades and Labour congress 
refused to adopt progressive strategies or launch 
organizational drives in new areas. In contrast, the 
Communist Party recognized the direction of modern work and 
initiated organizational activities in evolving industries and 
encouraged a new response. Acting through the Food Workers 
Industrial Union, the Communist Party pursued the organization 
of the meat packing industry and provided Winnipeg meat 
packing workers with an introductory experiment to a new type 
of association which organized all workers regardless of skill 
- industrial unionism. 
Employees at the Western Packing company were the first 
Winnipeg workers to receive such assistance from the Communist 
Party. Western Packing's workers organized into a local 
chapter of the Food Workers Industrial Union and sought change 
and betterment for themselves. When Western Packing's 
management refused to recognize the worker organization, a 
long, violent strike occurred to mark the first organization 
of Winnipeg's semi skilled packinghouse workers. 
Anti-union forces in Winnipeg combined to physically and 
legally crush the strike, and led to the failure of the 
attempt. While the strike failed to win change or betterment 
5 
for the workers, Winnipeg packinghouse workers' first 
experience with industrial unionism proved significant. 
First, the attempt provided Winnipeg meat packing workers with 
their initial experiment in which workers of all skills 
organized. Second, the organization was led by the Communist 
Party, which was active again in the 1940s, especially at 
Canada Packers. Finally, the strike failed under conditions 
different from those in the 1940s, as the local and national 
movement was weak and the state aggressively opposed the 
strike. 
In addition to such local conditions, organized labour 
throughout Canada and the United States experienced an overall 
strengtheninq in the mid-1930s. With organizational 
leadership and victories from the industrially-based Congress 
of Industrial Organization in the steel and automotive 
industries in the United States and Canada, unionism became 
more popular as workers received concrete evidence of the 
fruits of industrial union organization. These victories 
helped revive a general interest among workers and restored 
faith in the virtues of collective action and collective 
bargaining. 
Finally, wartime labour conditions greatly aided the 
eventual success of the 1940s drive in Winnipeg's meat packing 
industry. As World War II progressed, a wartime demand for 
goods and materials resulted in full employment. The urgency 
and importance of the War combined to create a situation where 
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the federal government insisted upon maintaining production of 
such vital industries as the meat packing industry and 
actively participated in labour matters. Further 
strengthening labour's position was the federal government's 
passage of PC 1003, which facilitated union recognition and 
prevented a rollback of organized labour's gains after the 
War. 
The combination of full employment and the government-
enforced need to maintain full production placed Winnipeg meat 
packing workers in an unprecedented position of bargaining 
power. It was from this situation that, beginning in 1943 at 
Canada Packers, Winnipeg packinghouse workers pursued 
unionism, organized themselves and won union recognition and 
collective bargaining. 
The story of Winnipeg's meat packing industry has 
received very little public attention, and even less has been 
written on the workers of Winnipeg's meat packing industry. 
This absence is surprising given the workers' remarkable 
struggle for union recognition and collective bargaining, and 
the industry's economic and social importance to Winnipeg. 
Thus far, short articles by Canada Packers' vice-president 
Ralph Parliament and political scientist Jim Silver remain the 
sole investigations of the Winnipeg meat packing industry. 
Jim Silver's article, "The Origin of Winnipeg's 
Packinghouse Industry: Transitions from Trade to Manufacture", 
traces the origins and development of the Winnipeg meat 
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packing industry. 1 Silver provides a brief history of 
Winnipeg entrepreneurs and early meat packing companies. The 
article documents how the Winnipeg industry evolved from its 
origins as a local industry in the late nineteenth century to 
a growing, nationally-centred operation in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. 
Silver's work provides a valuable comparison of 
nineteenth and twentieth century meat packing plants in 
Winnipeg. Although limited to a time span which does not 
reach 1925, Silver's work provides a starting point from which 
one can trace the transformation of the Winnipeg industry 
towards a modernized system which deskilled work and 
introduced mass production techniques. 
Apart from Silver's work, Ralph Parliament's curt 
examination of the Winnipeg meat packing industry remains the 
only other piece to detail the Winnipeg experience. 
Parliament's article "Winnipeg Livestock and Meat Processing 
Industry: A century of Development" provides an overall 
description of the Winnipeg meat packing industry. 2 Focusing 
on economic growth and the leadership of certain businessmen, 
1Jim Silver, "The Origins of Winnipeg's Packinghouse 
Industry: Transitions from Trade to Manufacture", Prairie 
Forum, (Spring 1994) 15-30. 
"Ralph Parliament, "Winnipeg Livestock and Meat 
Processing Industry: A Century of Development" in Winnipeg 
1874-1974 Progress and Prospects, Tony J. Kuz, ed. (Winnipeg: 
Manitoba Department of Industry and Commerce, 1974). 
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Parliament's work provides a glance at close to one hundred 
years of the industry. 
This thesis differs from the existing works on Winnipeg's 
meat packing industry. Whereas Silver and Parliament focus 
their energies on a corporate, economic agenda of the meat 
packing industry, this work examines the institutional labour 
history of Winnipeg's meat packing workers. 
The history of Winnipeg's meat packing workers provides 
an . insightful examination of twentieth century industrial 
workers. The Winnipeg experience traces the changing ri~ture 
of the industry from one which was highly skilled and 
localized, into a nationally-based, mass production industry. 
The subsequent history of. the workers involved, therefore 
provides an illustration of how Canadian workers responded to 
such change. 
Specifically, this thesis examines the path in which 
Winnipeg workers organized themselves to gain greater control. 
It is argued that the successful organizing drive in the 1940s 
occurred as a result of changing local conditions; a general 
strengthening of labour in the mid-1930s, and finally due to 
wartime labour conditions. 
Examinations of the meat packing industry has thus far 
focused on work or labour relations. Initially these broad 
investigations described a wide range of occupations and 
enterprises, with particular attention on the rise, 
consolidation and growth of national unionism. For example, 
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historian Harold Logan argued in the 1950s that the history of 
organized labour could be best understood through examination 
of national developments.• A subsequent generation of labour 
historians continued this approach, but focused their 
attention specifically on individual industries. Examples of 
these subsequent labour histories include works by David 
Brody, Leslie F. Orear and Stephen Diamond, Lewis Corey, John 
Tait Montague and George Sayers Bains.• 
These early labour histories filled a so-called "gap" in 
Canadian and American historiography. For hundreds of years 
histories had been written for, and about kings, generals and 
statesmen of society. While there is no disputing the value 
of such a service, the absence of historical study on working 
class peoples created a glaring historical gap. The early 
labour histories of Logan, Brody and Montague filled this gap 
3Among the first studies to focus on the history of 
organized labour came from J.R. Commons in the United States 
and Logan in Canada. These works include: H.A. Logan, Trade 
Vnions in Canada: Their pevelopment and Functioning (Toronto: 
MacMillan, 1948): The History of Trade Union organization in 
Canada (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928): and John 
R. Commons, History of Labor in the United States (New York: 
MacMillan, 1921}. 
•David Brody, The Butcher Wor!cman (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964): Leslie F. Orear and Stephen Diamond, 
Out of the Jungle (Chicago: Hyde Park Press, 1968): Lewis 
Corey, Meat and Man (New York: The Viking Press, 1950): John 
Tait Montague, Trade Qnionism in the Canadian Meat Packing 
Industry (University of Toronto: unpublished Ph.D thesis, 
1950): and George Sayers Bains, The United Packinghouse. Food 
and Allied workers (University of Manitoba: unpublished MA 
thesis, 1964) • 
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and provided a necessary and focused historical account of 
organized labour. 
As the history of the working class.and organized labour 
progresses however, these early accounts must be recognized as 
starting points. Although such accounts provide detailed 
histories of organized labour at the national level, they fail 
to extend specific attention to local events and to workers. 
Rather, these histories present scenarios in which the 
powerful, national union rescues the helpless, exploited 
workers. In doing so, these one-sided investigations 
unfortunately eclipse and minimize the importance of local 
incidents and events. 
When former union officials began composing their own 
histories, emphasis fell on local events. This style 
portrayed union organization not as the result of an 
omnipotent national union organizing drive, but as a result of 
local workers' determination and efforts to improve their lot. 
Included in this category are works by Fred Blum, Arthur 
Kampfert and Stella Nowicki." This approach has not yet been 
extended to the Winnipeg or Canadian meat packing experience, 
and there exist no such works. 
"Fred Blum, Towards A Democratic Work Process: The 
Hormel Packinghouse Workers' Experience (New York: Harper & 
Brothers Publisher, 1953); Arthur Kampfert, History of Meat 
Packing Industry Unions, 5 vols. (State Historical society of 
Wisconsin: unpublished, 1945); Stella Nowicki, "Back of the 
Yards. 11 In Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working Class 
Organizers. Alice and Staughton Lynd eds. (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1973): 67-89. 
11 
This thesis therefore seeks to fill a further gap in 
labour historiography while explaining the path in which 
Winnipeg workers won union recognition and secured collective 
bargaining. 
To best accomplish such an explanation, the thesis begins 
with an examination of the change and reorganization of the 
Winnipeg meat packing industry in the twentieth century. 
Changing conditions, which led to the first attempt by 
Winnipeg meat packing workers to unite in 1934, are then 
examined. The thesis then describes how local change, an 
overall strengthening of organized labour and wartime labour 
conditions contributed with a desire on the part of Winnipeg 
workers' to culminate in successful union recognition and 
collective bargaining. Finally, the thesis concludes with an 
examination and analysis of how the United Packinghouse 
Workers of America adopted a vigorous pursuit of national 
bargaining and the implications this strategy had on Winnipeg 
workers. 
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Chapter Two 
"Winnipeg's Jungle": 
Work and Industry in Winnipeg's 
Meat Packing Industry during the 1930s 
On 25 February 1925,· William Harris' son Joseph announced 
plans for the construction of a massive, modern meat packing 
plant in St. Boniface. 1 The construction of the Harris plant, 
which instantly became the most modern in Canada, emphasized 
the strategic importance of Winnipeg to the Canadian meat 
packing industry and served as the first large-scale example 
of the industry's emerging ideology of mass production. By 
locating the new plant next to the largest stock yards in 
Canada,• Winnipeg instantly secured itself as one of Canada's 
most important meat packing centres.• 
1Winnipeg Free Press, 26 February 1925. Although St. 
Boniface was an independent city in the 1930s and 1940s, due 
to its close proximity with Winnipeg and eventual 
incorporation into Metropolitan Winnipeg, this examination 
includes st. Boniface as part of Winnipeg. 
2The st. Boniface Stock Yards were the largest in Canada, 
covering almost 200 acres of land, holding 1,300 livestock 
pens, and 10 kilometres of rail tracks. Ralph Parliament, 
"Winnipeg Livestock and Meat Processing Industry: A Century of 
Development." In Winnipeg 1874-1974 Progress and Prospects. 
Tony J. Kuz ed. (Winnipeg: Manitoba Department of Industry 
and commerce, 1974), p.77. 
'As a national demand for meat grew, Winnipeg's 
centralized geographic location gave the city's meat packing 
enterprises prominence.- Since Western Canada provided a 
surplus agricultural area with vast land for livestock 
grazing, following the completion of the Trans-Canada railway 
and developments in railway refrigeration, it became more 
economical to slaughter and dress meat in Winnipeg than to 
ship livestock to eastern markets. For more on this subject, 
see: A.W. Craig, The Consequences of Provincial Jurisdiction 
for the Process of Company-Wide Collective Bargaining in 
Canada: A Study of the Packinghouse Iruiustry (Cornell 
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In addition to exemplifying a new structure of mass 
production organization within the meat packing industry, the 
Harris plant displayed a pattern of ownership and managerial 
strategy for the Winnipeg industry which lasted several 
decades. Headquartered in Toronto, the Harris Abattoir formed 
part of a national meat packing organization which in turn 
belonged to an industry oligopoly.• During the first decades 
of the twentieth century, many large-scale, national meat 
packing companies centralized and expanded operations. In 
doing so, these companies lowered unit costs and pressured 
many smaller companies to close operations or into 
affiliation. 
During this era, meat packing companies gradually 
reorganized work production by subdividing packinghouse work 
through the implementation of assembly-line techniques. In 
order to maximize profits from this transformation, companies 
turned to semi and unskilled workers. By deskilling work in 
meat packing plants, management avoided the high salaries and 
strong bargaining position of meat packing's skilled workers. 
University: unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1960), p.88; and William 
A. Kerr and s. Monica Ulmer, The Importance of tbe Livestock 
and Meat Processing Industries to Western Canada (Ottawa: 
Economic Council of Canada, 1984), p.6. 
'For more information on the nature of the Canadian meat 
packing industry see: A.J.E. Child, The Predecessor Companies 
of Canada Packers Limited: A study of Entrepreneurial 
Achievement and Entrepreneurial Failure (University of 
Toronto: unpublished MA thesis, 1960); and J.s. Willis,~ 
Packing Bµsiness: Tbe Historv and Deyelopment of the Use of 
Meat to Feed Hankind. from the Dawn of History to the Present 
(Toronto: Canada Packers, Limited, 1963). 
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The trend towards reorganization and nationalization 
extended throughout the industry. In 1926, the owner of the 
largest meat packing plant in Western Canada, Pat Burns, 
bought the smaller Winnipeg firm of Gallagher-Holman. More 
significantly for the Winnipeg and Canadian industry, four of 
Canada's largest meat packing companies merged to form Canada 
Packers in 1927." 
The result of such developments was that by the late 
1920s, the Canadian meat packing industry had become an 
oligopoly of three national firms: Canada Packers, Burns, and 
Swift Canadian.• Known collectively as the Big Three, Canada 
Packers• immense power dominated the oligopoly. Canada 
Packers controlled eleven meat packing plants and operated 
twenty-nine branch houses. With company holdings in almost 
every Canadian province, canada Packers employed thousands of 
workers. 
Following the 1927 merger, Winnipeg's status as a 
keystone of the Canadian meat packing industry grew. Winnipeg 
'Following the refusal of credit to the Hamilton-based 
meat packing company of Gunns Limited, in February 1927, the 
Harris Abattoir acquired the company for $1,193,220. Four 
months later, in a similar acquisition, the Harris Abattoir 
bought the financially-troubled Canadian Packing Company for 
$1,275,000. This pattern cumulated in August 1927, when the 
two largest meat packing companies in Canada, the Harris 
Abattoir and the William Davies company merged to form Canada 
Packers Limited. Willis, This PacJtinq Business, p.51. 
"This was confirmed by a 1935 Royal Commission, which 
concluded, "the packing industry ••• presents an illustration 
both of large scale production and monopolistic 
concentration". Canada, Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 
Final Report (ottawa: King's Printer, 1935), p.59. 
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possessed the most modern meat packing plant in Canada and 
served as Canada Packers' sole meat packing plant and 
distribution centre in Western Canada, while also improving 
the company's access to the eastern Canadian market. 7 
Finally, the city of Winnipeg held the distinction of being 
Canada's only city with meat packing plants of Canada Packers, 
Swift Canadian and Burns. This national design of the 
industry would later play a vital role in both the 
organization of workers and in the interaction of industrial 
relations • 
. As Winnipeg's meat packing industry entered the 
Depression, a stable demand in Canada for meat allowed the 
industry to remain relatively prosperous.• Al though the 
volume of meat production declined by 7 per cent from 1929 to 
1932, the norm for all other Canadian manufacturing industries 
was 33 .4 per cent.• Consequently, from 1933 until 1943, 
7 From 1927 until the 1950s, Manitoba's meat packing and 
slaughtering industry, based almost exclusively in Winnipeg, 
ranked as the province's largest industry in terms of gross 
value of products. Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 
Canada Yearbook (Ottawa: King's Printer), 1927-59. 
•curing the Depression (1929-1939), per capita meat 
consumption in Canada remained high at 50.30 pounds, with a 
relatively stable standard deviation of 2.58. Per capita pork 
consumption also was high at 51.07 pounds per person, and held 
a low standard deviation of only 2.83. Canada, Department of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Animal statistics (Ottawa: King's 
Printer), 1929-1939. 
"H.E. Bronson, "The Saskatchewan Meat Packing Industry: 
Some Historical Highlights," Saskatchewan History, vol. 26 
(Winter 1973), p.28. 
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slaughtering and meat packing never dropped below fourth place 
among Canada's leading forty industries. 10 
Further developments in Winnipeg displayed the prosperity 
of the Winnipeg industry and the continuation of emerging 
trends in the industry. On 6 August 1937, Canada's second 
largest meat packing company, Swift Canadian, announced its 
relocation to a new two million dollar plant in st. Boniface. 11 
The construction of Swift's ultramodern plant strengthened 
Winnipeg's status as Canada's single largest meat packing 
centre, and furthered the transformation towards a mass 
production-style of packinghouse organization. With the 
completion of the new plant in 1938, Winnipeg possessed the 
two most modern meat packing plants in Canada, and Canada's 
largest stock yards. 
Beyond the reorganization of the industry, the work 
process in meat packing plants also un.derwent great change. 
Gone forever were the days when meat packing operations were 
seasonal or a family - usually a butcher and his son -
affair •12 The industry, which coined the phrase, "a rope and 
1011Facts of the Meat Packing Strike." (1947), p.2. In 
United Packinghouse Food and Allied warkers Papers, box 482, 
folder 15. 
11In an agreement reflecting Swift's corporate power in 
the 1930s, st. Boniface city council passed a by-law fixing 
the assessment rates on property and buildings for the next 20 
years. In exchange, the company agreed to lend $33,000 to the 
city interest free for improvements of sewage pipe and street 
pavement. Winnipeg Free Press, 7 August 1937. 
12Jim Silver, "The Origins of Winnipeg's Packinghouse 
Industry: Transitions from Trade to Manufacture", Prairie 
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knife are all you need to go into business" 1 13 became dominated 
in the 1930s by massive plants, national corporations and the 
reorganization of work through the introduction of mass 
production work techniques. 
Historically, as growing urban populations demanded more 
meat, improvements in refrigeration encouraged the expansion 
of the meat packing industry. Slaughtering and dressing 
operations located themselves close to both livestock reserves 
and large cities. As the industry proved profitable, 
capitalists sought ways to reduce production costs and 
increase profits. 
Although the packinghouse industry pioneered moving 
production lines, the constantly varying size of livestock 
prohibited extensive use of machinery. 1 • consequently, work 
in meat packing plants remained highly labour intensive and 
the implementation of machinery limited. In 1933, for 
example, only 20 per cent of packinghouse workers operated 
machinery, while the rest worked by hand. 15 Because of this 
Forum, (Spring 1994), pp.27-28. 
1
'Margaret Walsh, The Rise of the Midwestern Meat Packing 
Industry (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1982), 
p.26 and Simon N. Whitney, Antitrust Policies: A1nerican 
Experience in Twenty Industries, · vol.1, (New York: The 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p.67. 
1
'While the assembly line is often associated with Henry 
Ford, Ford is said to have planned his automobile assembly 
line after watching a meat packing plant in Chicago at Armour. 
Whitney, Antitrust Policies, p.86. 
15James R. Barrett, Work and Community in the Jµngle: 
Chicago's Packinghouse Workers. 1894-1922 (Urbana: University 
18 
restriction, and the fact that companies reorganized 
slaughtering and dressing work into a vast number of simple, 
one step operations, Winnipeg plants employed vast numbers of 
semi and unskilled workers. 
Since these unskilled workers were part of production 
lines, management felt constant supervision by authoritarian 
foremen would ensure high levels of output. Because skilled 
and unskilled workers laboured in close proximity, both 
performed physical labour and neither got paid unless 
slaughtering lines were moving, they shared similar 
grievances. In part, this commonality later encouraged the 
popularity of industrial unionism. 
As the nature of meat packing prevented the automation of 
the labour-intensive industry, owners subdivided much of the 
work so that each worker performed only one or two semi or 
unskilled tasks, thereby reducing the need for skilled labour. 
The replacement of highly skilled butchers by semi and 
unskilled meat cutters reduced labour costs and increased 
greater control over hiring practices. Management's 
introduction of assembly lines methods further maintained a 
constant output and increased production and profits. 
By the 1930s, Winnipeg's meat packing industry was a 
large, impersonal industry in which workers frequently found 
employment at plant gates. In a situation similar to 
Chicago's Packingtown, hiring conditions in Winnipeg in the 
of Illinois Press, 1987), p.23. 
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1930s often parallelled those described by Upton Sinclair in 
The Jungle: 
[A]ll day long the gates of the packinghouses were 
besieged. Blizzards and cold made no difference to 
them, they were always on hand. sometimes their faces 
froze, sometimes their feet and their hands; sometimes 
they froze all together - but still they came, for 
they had no other place to go. 1 • 
In Winnipeg, Swift employee John Hauser spent over a month in 
1933 waiting for a job at Swift's plant gates. Every morning 
at 5:30 a.m., Hauser, along with 50 to 100 other men, waited 
for a timekeeper who chose "sturdy" bodies for a day's work. 
Since Swift and the other companies had no compelling reason 
to select a particular worker, companies continually ignored 
certain men. Winnipeg meat packing companies preferred to 
hire robust, athletic-looking workers, and avoided heavy or 
small men as they were considered unsuitable and undesirable 
for the manual, unskilled labour of packinghouse work. 17 
Another common way to gain employment in the meat packing 
industry was to have a personal link with a firm. During the 
Depression, travelling company salesmen often recruited rural 
workers to work in Winnipeg. Acting as corporate 
representatives, salesmen enticed town butchers and farm boys 
10Upton Sinclair, The· Jungle (New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 
1906), p.93. 
1
.
7 Interview John Hauser by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
Meat Packing Oral History Proiect, 1985, Provincial Archives 
of Manitoba. 
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with promises of work during times of high unemployment. 10 
Recruitment of rural workers was particularly favoured by meat 
packing companies. As Canada Packers superintendent Ronald 
Matthewson explained, they "understood farm life ••• animals, 
the slaughter of animals, manure ••• [they] weren't pampered11 • 1 • 
Once hired, workers completed personnel forms, listing 
their name, address and previous employment. Fred Benson, who 
worked as a foreman at Swift Canadian in the 1930s, explained 
that companies used this type of formula to screen out 
"potential labour pushers 11 • 20 A hired worker was then placed 
into one of the many departments of a Winnipeg meat packing 
plant. A Swift manual described operations similar to those 
in Winnipeg before World War II, and divided the plant into 
five departments: Beef Operationsi Pork Operationsi Sheep and 
Lamb Operationsi Manufacturingi and Service Department. 21 In 
Winnipeg, the beef and pork departments contained the bulk of 
10Interview Fred Billows by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
1
'Interview Ronald Matthewson by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 
1985. A high number of rural-born workers appeared in Dewalt's 
collection. Of the 18 workers hired before or during World 
War II, only 3 were born in Winnipeg while 15 were rural-born. 
20Interview Fred Benson by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
Following the Winnipeg General Strike in 1919, "blacklists" 
circulated among many Winnipeg businesses. Blacklists 
contained the names of workers who were involved, or suspected 
to have been involved, in union organizations. Blacklisted 
workers were considered dangerous and disruptive to management 
and therefore not hired. 
21Arthur H. carver, Personnel and Labour Problems in the 
Packing Industry (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1928), pp.27-28. 
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Swift's workforce, and saw workers slaughter and dress 
livestock. Manufacturing departments would then processed 
off al and meat byproducts into such products as oleo 
margarine, sausages, animal feeds, fertilizer, soap and glue, 
while service departments loaded and shipped products. 
Throughout Winnipeg plants, semi and unskilled workers 
performed the majority of work and comprised in excess of 
two-thirds of the workforce. The one domain which skilled 
workers retained, was the dressing of livestock. Following 
the slaughter, hoisting, bleeding and decapi ta ti on of an 
animal, a skilled worker known as the sider, removed the 
skin. 22 After the removal of an animal's skin, the splitter, 
another skilled worker, halved the carcass with a cleaver. 2 • 
With the carcass skinned and split, semi and unskilled 
workers carried out the remainder of dressing operations. 
Hung on a line of sliding hooks, successive workers performed 
specific cuts on the side before transferring the meat into 
22The sider has been referred to as the "aristocrat of all 
butchers", since a nick or scratch lowered a hide's value ore 
the hide, its value was greatly lowered. The importance of 
siders to plants was such that the Canada Packers' plant in 
Winnipeg imported siders from Toronto during the busy fall 
slaughtering season. Interview Ronald Matthewson by Bryan 
Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985, and Theodore Purcell, S.J. The Worker 
Speaks His Mind on Company and the Union (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1954), p.73. 
23By the early 1940s, the skilled job of the splitter was 
eliminated when carcass splitting saws were introduced to the 
labour process. Meat Packers Council, The Growth and 
Development of Canada's Meat Packing Industry, p.46. 
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like yours you aren't going to go very far with Burns ••• you 
have to be Anglo-Saxon to go some place. 1132 Furthermore, in 
Bryan Dewalt's study of Winnipeg packinghouse employees, five 
workers eventually reached management positions. Of the five 
to get promotions, four were Anglo-Saxon, while the fifth, 
Ukrainian-Canadian Joseph Wirwin noted that he did not have a 
Ukrainian sounding name, and "I didn't talk with an accent. 11 33 
These racist hiring and promotional policies later led 
packinghouse workers to demand implementation of seniority 
guidelines and the establishment of grievance procedures to 
reduce the arbitrary, racist power of management. 
Beyond the ethnic discrimination in packinghouse work, 
gender also played a discriminatory role. Historically, a 
widespread stereotype existed that slaughtering and meat 
packing was "men's work". The early exclusion of women, 
according to Edith Abbott and s.P. Breckinridge, was a result 
of the repulsive nature of the work, the physical demands 
involved, and the chauvinism of male butchers.•• Following the 
subdivision of packinghouse work and the limited introduction 
of machinery, patriarchal management saw an opportunity to 
''Interview Harry Hildebrand by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 
1985. 
33Interview Joseph Wirwin by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
34Edith Abbott and S.P. Breckinridge, "Women in Industry: 
The Chicago Stockyards," Journal of Political Economy vol.19 
(1911), pp.632-634. 
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incorporate cheap female labour into the emerging semi and 
unskilled jobs.•• 
As a result of the labour shortage that emerged in Canada 
during World war I, a significant number of women workers 
entered the meat packing industry." Despite their significant 
presence, women were assigned "female" jobs including 
packaging, wiener stuffing, bacon slicing, and sausage making. 
Women did not receive equal pay for their labour. For 
example, in 1934 at Canada Packers, starting wages for women 
were 25 cents an hour while men received 30 cents an hour. 
This situation was even worse at Burns, where starting wages 
for women were 16 and a half cents an hour, while men received 
25 cents an hour. Moreover, while at work, women workers 
received abuse and discrimination from both fellow employees 
and management, yet "didn't dare [tell of the abuse] because 
it was [considered] a good paying job"." 
The extent of female labour in Winnipeg's meat packing 
plants is difficult to measure. A glimpse into this domain 
however was found in the 1936 regional census.•• Census data 
revealed that of 808 workers employed in Winnipeg's meat 
.. Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle, p.57. 
'"Willis, This Packing susiness, p.43. 
"Interview Harry Hildebrand by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 
1985. 
30Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce. Census of 
tbe Prairie Provinces. 1936. vol.II, (ottawa: King's Printer, 
1938). 
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packing industry, only 41 (5.07 per cent) were women. Data 
further revealed that of the female workers, none held 
positions in the skilled, well-paying jobs of butchering or 
slaughtering. The report also illustrated that most women 
workers were young, with 26 of' 34 (77 per cent) workers under 
the age of 24, and only 9 per cent over the age of 34. 
Finally, the census showed the lack of advancement for women 
workers - in 1936 there was only one woman foreman in the 
entire industry, and no female managers or owners.'• 
The bulk of work in a packing plant was labour intensive, 
semi or unskilled, physically demanding, and dictated by one's 
ethnicity or gender. While some workers laboured in extremely 
hot conditions, others toiled in the cold and damp. Both 
environments, however affected workers' health. workers who 
processed cold meat or laboured in cooler rooms, suffered 
reduced blood flow to the skin that caused numbness and made 
existing joint problems worse. In contrast, those working in 
warm slaughtering areas fought heat fatigue which increased 
the potential for accident. 
Among Winnipeg packinghouse workers' most serious 
complaint, however, was the hurried nature of work and the 
authority of their supervisors. Since the Stock Yards charged 
for holding livestock, packinghouse management insisted that 
animal slaughter occur the same day as livestock purchase. 
>•It was not until 1960 that Burns hired its first female 
supervisor. Interview Vera Slobodian Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 
1985. 
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While livestock usually arrived at night, purchase did not 
occur until the morning. Consequently, animals seldom arrived 
on the killing floor before 9:00 a.m •• '° Despite this, 
companies insisted that workers report for work at 7:00 a.m. 
and wait, without pay, until the animals were available for 
processing." 
Even worse than the long hours waiting for work, was the 
knowledge among the workers that their jobs were seasonal and 
layoffs possible at anytime. In the busy fall season, •2 a 
worker could expect to work up to 70 to 75 hours a week, 
without overtime pay.•• However, when the autumn rush ended, 
usually following Christmas, layoffs of 16 to 20 per cent of 
the employees occurred, often without any advanced notice." 
Under this system, at the end of the day a foreman simply 
distributed pink or blue slips to workers, indicating that 
"'George Sayers Bains, The United Packinghouse. Food and 
Allied Wor]ters (University of Manitoba: unpublished MA 
thesis, 1964),p.22. 
41Interview Robert Watts by 
Manitoba, 1985 and interview John 
Winnipeg, 1985. 
Bryan Dewalt, Warren, 
Hauser by Bryan Dewalt, 
42Based on a three year sample of 1937, 1941 and 1945, the 
busiest months for slaughter in the Winnipeg Stock Yards were 
October and November for cattle, and November and December for 
hogs. The slowest months for the slaughter of cattle were May 
and June, and July and August for hog slaughter. Canada, 
Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Animal Statistics, 
1937, 1941 and 1945. 
0 Interview Henry Baker by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
See also, voice of Labour, 19 April 1934. 
••Interview Earl Cockle by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
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their services were no longer required.•• Aggravation to this 
precarious situation occurred since seniority was not a 
deciding factor. such conditions caused great anxiety among 
workers about who would lose their job, and later contributed 
to worker demands for job security and seniority. 
Although companies held a hierarchy, the foreman was in 
charge of daily supervision and operations. In this role, he 
held the authority to hire, fire, and discipline employees. 
In the minds of many workers, the foreman had "absolute 
power ••• he could do anything he wanted. 11 •• This unchecked, 
unquestionable control allowed a foreman to: 
[D]ecide absolutely ••• if he liked what you did then 
you worked, and if he didn't like what you did [sic] -
no way ••• they just fired ya. That's all. Just, 
goodbye - don't want ya!" 
To further complicate matters, favouritism usually accompanied 
such "absolute power", and a worker's popularity influenced 
his or her likelihood of being laid off or promoted.•• One 
former worker commented that since Canada Packers' 
superintendent Daniel Clements was a Cameron Highlander, "if 
••interview John Hauser by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
••interview Maurice Yeo by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
See also, Purcell, The Worker Speaks, p.123. 
''Interview Ronald Matthewson by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 
1985. 
••one former worker was able to avoid getting laid off in 
the 1930s because he played for the company hockey team, and 
his hockey coach doubled as his foreman. Interview Ronald 
Matthewson by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
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you were a Cameron Highlander, or Masonic order, you had it 
made ••• you couldn't get fired no matter what. 11 •• As a result 
of this process, the limitation of foreman's power and 
establishment of a grievance procedure and seniority list were 
important motivations for workers to support the union. 
During the Depression, high unemployment forced workers 
to accept such horrendous working conditions, since "in them 
days any job was a nice job ••• just to have a job was 
something.""" This scarcity of jobs allowed companies to 
create dozens of different pay levels. starting wages at the 
plants of the Big Three depended not only on work performed, 
but the age, sex and perhaps gender of the worker. A table of 
wages paid by swift Canadian in 1935, revealed over 171 
different pay rates for its employees. Wages for men ranged 
from 30 cents an hour for unskilled jobs, to 63.6 cents an 
hour for highly skilled butchers. The gender equality again 
emerges as women received only 20 to 33 and a half cents an 
hour.•1 In order for a worker to get a raise, one had to 
personally ask the foreman - a process that led former foreman 
••Interview Maurice Yeo by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
""Interview Josephine (McNamara) Baker by Bryan Dewalt, 
Winnipeg, 1985. 
•
1canada, Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, vol. 36 
( 1936), pp. 60-61. This table also revealed the growing 
dominance of semi and. unskilled workers, since of the 171 
different paying positions, only nine jobs (5 per cent) paid 
more than 50 cents an hour. 
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and superintendent Ronald Matthewson to comment that "getting 
a raise was like pulling teeth. 11 • 2 
The work situation in Winnipeg worsened in the 1930s, 
when companies adopted the infamous Bedeaux system. A 
standards process invented by Charles Bedeaux, the "Bedeaux 
system" measured worker output in a pounds-per-minute output 
quota. Management established output quotas and rewarded 
those workers who exceeded it with a bonus. However, if a 
worker did not meet his or her quota, discipline resulted. 
This despised system forced workers to constantly work faster 
and increased tension between workers and management.•• 
Furthermore, as employees worked at faster and faster speeds, 
the probability of accidents increased dramatically. 
The nature of Winnipeg packinghouse work in the 1930s, 
prompted former workers to comment that "packinghouses are not 
the healthiest place to work", and "sometimes the best thing 
in the world is to get fired. 11 •• It has been argued that the 
financial nature of the meat packing industry led companies to 
be more cost conscious than quality conscious, with increased 
productivity as the bottom line. such pressure on workers to 
52Interview Ronald Matthewson by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 
1985. 
"The hatred of packinghouse workers for this system, was 
such that when Bedeaux died in 1944, The Packinghouse Worker, 
heralded his death as the end of "an enemy of labour." 
"'Interview Fred Billows and Henry Baker, by Bryan Dewalt, 
Winnipeg, 1985. For an examination of similar concerns in 
Chicago, see, Purcell, The Worker Speaks, p.116. 
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increase production, explains the high number of industrial 
accidents in packinghouse work. 
Beyond such immediate risks as knife cuts or gashes,•• the 
United States Department of Labor identified a list of health 
hazards in packinghouse work in 1943. These hazards, which 
were also found in Winnipeg plants, included: slippery floors, 
crowded working conditions, improper traffic layout, poor 
maintenance of machines and work areas, poor housekeeping 
practices, inadequate planning of plants, and injuries from 
over lifting.•• While there are no statistics on packinghouse 
accidents in Winnipeg, American statistics reveal the 
hazardous nature of the industry. In 1943, one in ten 
American packinghouse workers was injured or became ill at 
work."' Further data from Department of Labor revealed that 
of all packinghouse accidents, 34 per cent were cuts and 
lacerations, 27 per cent bruises, and 20 per cent strains and 
sprains.•• 
05As late as 1988, up to 50% of packinghouse work was 
still done by knives. Joel Novek et al. Hechanization. the 
Labour Process and Injury Risks in the Canadian Meat Packing 
Industry (unpublished: Manitoba Federation of Labour Library), 
p.6. 
••united States, Department of Labour, Iniuries and 
Accident Causes in the Slaughtering and Meat Packing Industry. 
l..2..i.J. (Washington: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1945), p.54. 
See also, The Packinghouse Worker, 11 August 1944. 
"'Packinghouse Worker, 11 August 1944. 
••united States, Department of Labour, Injuries and 
Accidents, p.59. 
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·Beyond immediate risks, packinghouse work led to long 
term health hazards such as carpel tunnel syndrome, 
tendinitis, and brucellosis. with the high degree of 
specialization in meat packing, one worker often repeated one 
specific knife cut, or a series of knife cuts, as many as 
10,000 times a day.•• Such repeated movements, combined with 
gripping and twisting, caused pressure on nerves and result in 
permanent weakness and pain.~ This situation worsened if a 
knife was dull, as extra effort placed further strain on the 
tendons in the wrist and hand and increasing the possibility 
of slippage. 
While medical diagnosis and treatment were often ignored, 
former meat cutters described not being able to work as long 
as anticipated, and having to soak their hands in hot water 
after work to relieve sore muscles. •1 Furthermore, since the 
nature of packinghouse work has changed little in the past 50 
years, recent medical and ergonomical studies of packinghouse 
work merit attention and cast light on packinghouse work in 
the 1930s. In 1983, Eira Viikari-Juntara found that of 113 
••chicago Tribune, 25 October 1988. 
""Modern ergonomics experts have suggested to avoid this 
problem, joints must be rested through job rotation, frequent 
rests and breaks, or a reduced pace of work. None of these 
suggestions were ever implemented in packinghouse work, as 
jobs were closely guarded, and rests were unheard of. Ulrika 
Wallersteiner, "Workplace Factors Contributing to the 
Musculoskeletal Disorders of Meat Process Workers," 
Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Human Factors 
Association of Canada (1988), p.106. 
•
11nterview Fred Billows by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
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packinghouse workers, 41. 7 per cent experienced back problems, 
49.1 per cent experienced neck and shoulder troubles, and 59.8 
per cent had arm and hand soreness.•• similarly, a 1987 study 
of 400 former Canadian packinghouse workers revealed that 46 
per cent of meat cutters had back pains, 29 per cent had 
shoulder pains, and 22 per cent had hand disorders.•• 
In addition, recent medical studies have also concluded 
that workers in the meat packing industry hold a high 
probability to contract brucellosis or Mediterranean Fever. 
Of the four known ways to be infected with brucellosis, three 
are, and have always been, present in the meat packing 
industry. These include: exposure of skin to warm, freshly 
killed meat: conjunctive contact with droplets of tissue 
fluids: and inhalation of air-born dust from animals.•• 
Studies on this disease, which causes a loss of appetite, 
joint pains, weight loss and tiredness, have concluded that 
62Eira Viikari-Juntara, "Neck and Upper Limb Disorders 
Among Slaughterhouse workers: An Epidemiological and Clinical 
study," Scandinavian Journal of Environmental Health, vol.9 
(1983), p.288. 
63Ulrika Wallersteiner and Danielle Sciarretta, Ergonomics 
and the Meat Processing Industry: Examining the 
Musculoskeletal Problems in Retail and Wholesale Workers 
(unpublished: Manitoba Federation of Labour), p.3. 
"'B. c. Alleyne et al. "Rate of Slaughter May Increase 
Risk of Human Brucellosis in a Meat Packing Plant," Journal of 
Occupational Medicine, vol.28, no.6 (June 1986), p.445. 
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employment in a meat packing plant poses up to a 40 per cent 
risk of infection.•• 
Such harsh and dangerous conditions present in Winnipeg's 
meat packing industry in the 1930s contributed to an extremely 
young workforce. As a result of the physically demanding 
conditions of work, packinghouse workers did not work long in 
the industry. A 1936 regional census revealed that of 572 
Winnipeg packinghouse butchers and slaughterers, almost 50 per 
cent (281 workers) were younger than 34 years old. In 
addition, among 167 meat canners, curers, and packers employed 
in Winnipeg, close to 72 per cent (120 workers) were younger 
than 34 years old, and less than 13 per cent (21 workers) were 
older than 45. 60 
By the 1930s, Winnipeg's meat packing industry had 
reorganized and the nature of work changed. Winnipeg 
represented a strategic site in the Canadian meat packing 
industry and possessed one of the largest and most modern meat 
packing centres in Canada, although ownership and 
administration were now based in Toronto, Chicago and Calgary. 
Along with the reorganization of the industry, Winnipeg plant 
operations expanded as companies invested more capital in 
their plants. companies seeking greater profits ignored 
""H.S. Heineman and I.M. Dziamski, "Brucella Suis 
Infection in Philadelphia: A survey of Hog Fever and 
Asymptomatic Brucellosis," American Journal of Epidemiology, 
vol.103, no.l (1976), p.98. 
••canada, census of the Prairie Provinces. 1936, p.19. 
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limitations imposed on the industry by machinery and 
introduced new methods of mass production work. In this 
period, companies reorganized and subdivided traditional 
packinghouse jobs, and introduced semi and unskilled workers 
to the industry. 
As a result, working conditions in Winnipeg packinghouses 
during the 1930s were harsh, insecure, dangerous and dictated 
by one's ethnicity and gender. workers were not only 
subjected to long hours of work (without break) in the fall, 
and layoffs in the winter, but also had to deal with absolute 
power and favouritism from foremen. With little bargaining 
power, such grievances led workers to call for change, and 
seek improved working conditions. As the nature and 
organization of work changed, Winnipeg packinghouse workers' 
search for improved working conditions also took a new form. 
The increasing popularity of industrial unionism offered 
direction for Winnipeg packinghouse workers, and was first 
attempted in 1934 at the Western Packing company. 
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Chapter Three 
•support the Heroic Western Packing Company Strikers•: 
Winnipeg's Packinghouse Industry, Industrial. Unionism and 
The Western Packing company strike of 1934 
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
the Winnipeg meat packing industry reorganized and adopted 
modern production techniques. By 1934, working conditions in 
Winnipeg packinghouses were harsh, dangerous and dictated by 
one's ethnicity and gender. Workers faced low wages, insecure 
seasonal employment and authoritarian foremen. These 
conditions led workers to call for change. The practicality 
of industrial unionism and necessity of a united 
organizational approach offered direction and a means to bring 
about change for packinghouse workers. In 1934 a crucial step 
in the path to gain collective bargaining and union 
recognition transpired at the Western Packing Company. 
Although the first attempt at industrial unionism 
occurred in 1934, Winnipeg's skilled butchers and slaughterers 
had initiated the first attempt at craft unionism in 1916. 
During World War I, as meat packing companies registered 
record profits, the first early attempts to transform and 
deskill work occurred. 
At the start of the war, it was not uncommon for one 
worker to be responsible for the complete dressing of a 
slaughtered animal. To improve production and reduce labour 
costs, management began to subdivide this work process. As a 
result, during the war companies hired unskilled workers for 
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semiskilled meat cutting jobs, thus decreasing the bargaining 
power and status of skilled workers while at the same time 
uniting workers through a commonality of work. 
High inflation levels, rapidly declining standards of 
living and charges of war profiteering against Canada's 
packers further inspired Winnipeg's skilled workers to 
organize. 1 In face of these conditions, in 1916, 350 skilled 
workers from Gallagher Holman, Gordon Ironsides and Fares, and 
Swift Canadian formed Local 549 of the Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters and Butcher Workmen, to secure their bargaining power 
and status. 2 
1 In 1917, charges of war profiteering were directed at 
Canada's largest meat packing organization, the William Davies 
Company. Public hatred for this alleged wartime exploitation 
was so great, that the company's president, Joseph Flavelle, 
was said to be the most hated man in Canada. Michael Bliss, 
A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and Times of Sir Joseph 
Flayelle, Bart. 1858-1939 (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 
1978), pp.336-337; and Larry Peterson, "The One Big Union in 
International Perspective: Revolutionary Industrial Unionism 
1900-1925," Labour/Le Trayeilleur 7 (Spring 1981), p.63. 
•craft based, or horizontal unionism seeks to organize 
skilled workers exclusively. Industrial, or vertical 
unionism, on the other hand includes organization of all 
workers, regardless of skill. There existed few labour 
organizations interested in organizing the meat packing 
industry. The craft-based, Amalgamated which was affiliated 
with the American Federation of Labour maintained a monopoly 
over Canadian meat packing union organization until 1921. 
This preoccupation with craft based unionism occurred despite 
the fact that in 1911, the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress 
adopted the principle of industrial unionism in certain 
instances , J, A. P. Hayden, Trades and Labour Congress of 
Canada. History. Encyclopedia. Reference Book, part II (1939), 
p.171 and Canadian Labour Congress Papers, National Archives 
of Canada. 
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In January 1917, Local 549 approached the Winnipeg 
companies for union recognition. When the companies refused 
the workers' demands, the local went on one of the first 
strikes in Winnipeg meat packing history. Initially the 
strikers received support from unorganized semi and unskilled 
workers, and the beef kill stopped. However, as increased 
numbers of livestock arrived at the plants, the companies 
brought in replacement workers and the unorganized returned. 
Al though operations resumed, the presence of strikers and 
picket lines prompted the companies to pursue legal action. 
In March 1917, the companies obtained injunctions that 
prevented union leaders from appearing on the picket lines. 
In addition, the companies personally sued the local 
president, secretary and two members of the union for $10,000 
each, claiming they had persuaded strikers from returning to 
work.' Unable to mount an adequate defense against the 
lawsuit, the union officials promised to stop the picket 
lines. 
Despite the end of picket lines, however, the companies 
did not rehire the striking workers or negotiate with the 
union and by the end of April, the companies reported to the 
Department of Labour that all striking workers had been 
replaced and the strike terminated.• These events crushed 
'Voice of Labour, 16 March 1917. 
•canada, Department of Labour. Strikes and Lockout 
Files, (Ottawa: unpublished), T2693, vol.305, No. 27. 
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the local in Winnipeg. From the defeat came the realization 
that Winnipeg packing companies would not passively allow 
union organization in their plants and that successful 
organization would have to be total. Furthermore, the 
resumption of work foreshadowed a future trend in which the 
bargaining power, high wages and status of skilled workers in 
meat packing plants dwindled. 
While the organizational attempt failed, and did not 
include semi or unskilled worker, a belief in collective 
action among packinghouse workers did not disappear. During 
the Winnipeg General strike, approximately 450 unorganized 
meat packing workers went on strike from 15 May until 26 June 
1919. 5 Although packinghouse workers did not receive improved 
working conditions from their participation in the General 
Strike, this action displayed a general conviction for 
collective action and a belief in unionism by Winnipeg 
workers. 
The Winnipeg General Strike had a profound experience on 
organized labour. For Canadian packinghouse workers, this 
manifestation prompted a clampdown on organized labour 
activity. Prior to 1916, there had been no strikes in 
Canadian packinghouses. 
conditions and gradual 
However, with wartime living 
steps towards a large-scale 
reorganization of work, packinghouse workers across Canada 
"Canada, strikes and Loc1cout Files, T6180, vol. 2272, No. 
19-184. 
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went on a number of unrelated strikes for improved bargaining 
power and union recognition. Although Winnipeg workers failed 
in their attempt to improve conditions, workers in Vancouver, 
Stratford, Toronto.and Montreal proved successful during 1917 
and 1918.• 
Following the Winnipeg General strike, however, Canadian 
packinghouse workers entered a period of hostile opposition 
from both management and government. From 26 June 1919 until 
the end of 1921, ten strikes occurred in Canadian 
packinghouses. In all ten instances, the employers were 
victorious.' 
Following the defeat of the General Strike and the 
subsequent Red Scare decade of the 1920s, Winnipeg 
packinghouse workers, like other Winnipeg workers retreated 
from direct workplace organization.• organized labour learned 
"For more information on these strikes, see: Strikes and 
=L~o~c~k~o~u~t,__&F~i~lse~s, vol.306, No.28; vol.308, No.44 and 458; 
vol.312, No. 107; and vol.315, No.315. 
'For more information on strike activity in Canadian 
packinghouses from 1919 to 1921, see: John Tait Montague, 
Trade Unionism in the Canadian Meat Packing Industry 
(University of Toronto: unpublished Ph.D thesis, 1950). For 
information on packinghouse labour in the United States 
following the war, see: James R. Barrett, Work and Community 
in the Jungle: Chicago's Packinahouse Workers. 1894-1922 
(Urbana: University of Illinois, 1985); and Lizabeth Cohen, 
Making a New peal: Industrial Workers in Chicago. 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
"In large part, this moderatism may be attributed to the 
fact that following the General Strike, at least 3,500 
Winnipeg unionists were fired and many more were blacklisted. 
David E. Hall, Times of Troµble: Labour Quiescence in 
Winnipeg. 1920-1929 (University of Manitoba: unpublished MA 
thesis, 1983), p.28. 
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from the General Strike that the state would act as an ally of 
business, and proved willing to crush any labour organization 
that threatened the interests of capital. 9 The hostile labour 
arena worsened with the post-War collapse of the export meat 
market in 1920 which led North American meat packing companies 
to reduce wages and lay off workers. 
While no formal union action occurred in Winnipeg 
following the collapse of the export market and the subsequent 
wage reductions and layoffs, the Amalgamated Meat cutters and 
Butcher Workmen led unsuccessful protest strikes in Montreal, 
Toronto and Chatham and in the united states. By this point, 
however, opposition to organized labour was too powerful. 
Consequently when every union-led strike failed, the 
Amalgamated relinquished jurisdictional control of the 
Canadian meat packing industry to the Canadian Trades and 
Labour Congress (TLC). Despite sole organizational 
jurisdiction, however, the conservative leadership of the TLC 
took no initiative. The hard times of the Depression 
furthered the TLC's static position, and within a short period 
of time all organization ceased in the Canadian meat packing 
industry. 10 
9 Irving Abella, on strike: six Key Labour struggles in 
Canada 1919 - 1949 (Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, Publishers, 
1974),p.xv, and Bryan Palmer, Working Class Experience 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), pp.259-261. 
10Doug smith, Let Us Rise! A History of the Manitoba 
Labour Movement (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1985), p.75. 
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Poor organizational leadership from the TLC and high 
unemployment contributed to a lack of organization in the 
Canadian meat packing industry from 1921 until 1934. During 
this sterile, interwar period, Canada Packers, Swift Canadian 
and Burns introduced company unions to placate their workers •11 
Designed to voice worker grievances and improve plant 
operations, company unions represented a form of impotent 
worker representation. Company unions did not offer or 
provide workers with any real power, since all motions were 
subject to company veto and outside recruitment of assistance 
was forbidden. 
The revival of unionism in the meat packing industry came 
from attempts directed by the Canadian Communist Party. In 
1928, a new policy of the Communist International advocated 
building radical new labour organizations rather than trying 
to work within existing ones. The Red International of Labour 
Unions stated, "the whole attention of the Communist Party of 
Canada must be directed towards trade union work. 1112 
Consequently, following international directives, the Workers 
Unity League (WUL) was founded on 10 November 1929.13 The 
11These systems were first introduced at Swift Canadian 
in 1922, and followed at Canada Packers in 1933, and Burns in 
1937. 
12Lita-Rose Betcherman, The Little Band: The Clashes 
Between the Communists and the Political and Legal 
Establishments in Canada (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, no 
date), p.130. 
13Since, Section 98 of the Criminal Code made it illegal 
to belong to a revolutionary association, the affiliation of 
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WUL's constitution claimed "The organization of the 
unorganized must be the main and central task". In 1930, WUL 
organizer Charlie Sims reported: 
[T]his means that our work in Southern Ontario stands 
before us in the following manner: the organization of 
the unorganized industries ••• Auto, Steel, Textile, 
Chemical, Rubber and Meat Packing. 14 
By 1934, the WUL' s membership accounted for 21, 253 
members, 1 • or 7.7 per cent of all Canadian unionists, and the 
organization expanded into the meat packing industry. Formed 
in 1933, the Food Workers Industrial Union (FWIU) was a 
division of the WUL based in Winnipeg and placed under the 
administration of its General Executive Secretary, Winnipeg 
the WUL with the communist Party was not emphasized. William 
Beeching and Phyllis Clark, Yours in the Struggle: 
Reminiscences of Tim Buck (Toronto: NC Press Ltd., 1977), 
p.148. For more information on the WUL and the Communist 
Party in this period, see: Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist 
Party in Canada A History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Limited, 1975); Ian Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks: The Early 
Years of the Communist Party in Canada (Montreal: Vanguard 
Publications, 1981); and Betcherman, The Little 
rumg. 
1411Workers Unity League Constitution, 1933", and "Report 
of Comrade Charles Sims", in Communist Party of Canada Papers, 
National Archives of Canada, volume 52. 
""ff.A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development 
and Functioning (Toronto: MacMillan, 1948), p.371. 
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Alderman Jacob Penner •10 The same year, the FWIU organized 
four locals, including one in Winnipeg. 
The Winnipeg communist Party in the early 1930s included 
many Ukrainian-Canadians. 17 Following a criticism of 
organizational action, the communist Party paper The W9rker 
sent a message to Winnipeg Communists that "The Party wants 
(organizational) action."18 It is significant to note that the 
Communist Party did not restrict its organizational efforts to 
skilled workers. Realizing the changing n.ature of the 
capitalist system, all WUL unions organized workers regardless 
of skill. Therefore, the FWIU organizational activity 
represented the first industrial organizational drive in the 
meat packing industry. 
10The reasons for the selection of Winnipeg as FWIU head 
office, and Penner for the chief executive are not revealed in 
any primary or secondary sources. One can speculate however 
that Winnipeg was an obvious choice for a head office given 
the city's strong Communist connections and organization, • 
militant labour tradition and prominence as a meat packing 
centre. Moreover, Jacob Penner had served as a longstanding 
Communist Alderman in Winnipeg and represented a powerful 
Communist figure and politician in the city. 
17Betcherman, The Little Band, p. 98. 
""The message from the District organizing Secretary read, 
"The Ukrainian mass organizations must actively participate in 
building the WUL •••• In Winnipeg, for instance, the Party 
Comrades ••• have failed to carry through an industrial 
registration · in the mass organizations •••• The Party wants 
action. D. Holmes [Khomyshyn], in The Worker, 7 January 1931, 
quoted in John Kolasky ed. Proohets and Proletarians: 
Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of U1crainian 
Communists in Canada (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies Press, 1990), p.141. 
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Standard organizational procedure by the WUL involved a 
delegation of workers approaching the union and requesting 
help. 19 Organizational work soon began in Winnipeg's Ukrainian-
dominated meat packing industry and at the Western Packing 
Company in particular. Western Packing did not belong to the 
Big Three, nor was it a nationally-owned corporation. one can 
speculate that Western Packing was targeted because of the 
fact that it was a locally-owned company and potentially seen 
by union organizers as an easier ground for which to succeed. 
In addition, Western Packing might have proved attractive to 
union officials due to the high number of first generation 
Ukrainian Canadians, or since working conditions at Western 
Packing were among the worst in Winnipeg. 
Besides the hazardous, seasonal nature of all 
packinghouse work, Western Packing workers were the lowest 
paid in the city. A comparison of wages at Western Packing 
and Swift Canadian revealed that in 1934, the majority of 
Western Packing workers received half the salary of their 
counterparts at Swift's."" As a result of such factors, in 
1911An interview with Mitch 8ag011 , Hanitoba Histot::y, NUmber 
9, spring 1985, p.20. 
""A comparison of hourly wages at Western Packing and 
Swift Canadian revealed the pay inequalities: 
Departments Western Packing swift Canadian 
killing 15-32¢ 30-60¢ 
cutting 15-30¢ 30-50¢ 
casing 22.5-32.5¢ 30-45¢ 
shipping 15¢ 36.5-40¢ 
kitchen 20-25¢ 30-35¢ 
pickling 22-22.5¢ 35-40¢ 
cooler 20-32.5¢ 30-40¢ 
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1933, pro union workers at western Packing requested 
organizational aid from the WUL and the Party created a FWIU 
local. 21 Shortly after, the workers elected a shop com:mittee 
and instructed committee head Joseph Tropak to confront 
manaqement with their demands. 22 
On 6 March 1934, Tropak and the FWIU delegation 
approached H.V. Kobold, Western Packing's President and 
General Manager. The deleqation presented Kobold with a list 
of qrievances callinq for an end to abusive language from 
management, and demanding a wage increase of 10 cents per 
hour, time and a half for overtime and Sundays off.•• The most 
important demand, however, was recognition of their union and 
the creation of a closed shop.•• 
drivers $18/week $24/week 
Source: Yoice of Labour, 26 April 1934. 
21As there exist very few primary sources on the Communist 
Party in Winnipeg or the Western Packing company, it is 
difficult to estimate the extent of Communists within Western 
Packing. one can speculate, however, that given the choice of 
the FWIU to organize at Western Packinq, there must have been 
support from workers who were either communist sympathizers, 
associates or Party members. 
"Of approximately 100 workers at the plant, the union 
claimed a membership of 100. voice of Labour, 5 April 1934. 
"Yoice of L§boµr, 5 April 1934 • 
.. Although waqe increases dominated contract negotiations 
during the 1930s and 1940s, it is suggested that workplace 
conditions translated to demands for waqe increases as it was 
easier to negotiate for wages than to call for a restructurinq 
of operations. For more on this theory , see Richard Hyman, 
Strik.es (London: Fontana, 1977). 
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Kobold's return was quick and determined. The company 
manager summoned police and threatened to fire any worker 
joining strike action against the company. Despite this, on 
7 March, all 43 members of the FWIU walked out on strike. 
This action began what would become one of Winnipeg's most 
violent strikes, and Western Canada's second longest strike in 
1934. In addition, the strike held significant importance for 
the future of meat packing organization in Winnipeg as this 
represented Winnipeg workers' first attempt at industrial 
unionism. 
Determined to keep the plant in operation, non union 
workers remained at work, and management attempted to run 
operations as usual. On the other side, striking union 
members formed picket lines and established a soup kitchen for 
picketers. 25 Violence, a common occurrence during the 
strike, On 6 March 1934, Tropak and the FWIU delegation 
approached H. V. Kobold, Western Packing's President and 
General Manager. The delegation presented Kobold with a list 
of grievances calling for an end to abusive language from 
management, and demanding a wage increase of 10 cents per 
hour, time and a half for overtime and Sundays off.•• The most 
""The strike was characterized by a large, and active role 
played by sympathizers. Although difficult to prove, one can 
assume that a large proportion of these picketers were members 
of the Communist Party or Communist sympathizers. 
••voice of Labour, 5 April 1934. 
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important demand, however, was recognition of their union and 
the creation of a closed shop. 27 
Kobold's return was quick and determined. The company 
manager summoned police and threatened to fire any worker 
joining strike action against the company. Despite this, on 
7 March, all 43 members of the FWIU walked out on strike. 
This action began what would become one of Winnipeg's most 
violent strikes, and Western Canada's second longest strike in 
1934. In addition, the strike held significant importance for 
the future of meat packing organization in Winnipeg as this 
represented Winnipeg workers' first attempt at industrial 
unionism. 
Determined to keep the plant in operation, non union 
workers remained at work, and management attempted to run 
operations as usual • On the other side, striking union 
members formed picket lines and established a soup kitchen for 
picketers... Violence, a collll'llon occurrence during the strike, 
erupted on the first day of the strike when 40 picketers 
prevented Western Packing's trucks from leaving the plant, and 
a free-for-all fight erupted between the truck drivers and the 
270f approximately 100 workers at the plant, the union 
claimed a membership of 43. 
~strike was characterized by a large, and active role 
played by sympathizers. Although difficult to prove, one 
canassume that a large proportion of these picketers were 
members of the Collll'llunist Party or Communist sympathizers. 
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picketers. The Winnipeg police department quickly intervened, 
and arrested its first striker. 3 
Although several other similar instances followed, 
including police arrests and interventions, the picket lines 
held strong and the strikers intensified their actions. The 
FWIU created a large, local support committee that organized 
a house to house collection"' for funds to support the 
strikers, while the Canadian Labour Defense League petitioned 
that those arrested.be released on bail." 
Tension increased as the strike progressed. on Monday, 
12 March, violence again erupted. With over 100 picketers in 
place, Kobold personally drove workers into the plant. This 
prompted picketers to launch a barrage of stones, with one 
smashing Kobold's windshield and hitting a replacement worker 
in the face. The picketers then attacked another replacement 
worker as he entered the plant, and again tried to prevent 
company trucks from leaving the plant.•• These actions, the 
strike's most violent to date, led Winnipeg police to call up 
reserves to help breakup the picket line. Despite the 
intensifying violence, Kobold continued to try to lead 
~innipeg Free Press, 13 March .1934. 
"'By 9 March, the FWIU had given relief to the families 
of four strikers. voice of Labour, 5 April 1934. 
"The Canadian Defense Labour League functioned as a 
national branch of Comintern-directed international aid 
organization, and was led by Winnipeg's A.E. Smith. 
Betcherman, Tbe Little Band, p.35. 
"'Winnipeg Free Press, 13 March 1934. 
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replacement workers through the pickets and denounced the 
strikers as communists and refused to meet or recognize the 
strikers. 33 
The result was vicious confrontations between the 
strikers and replacement workers. on 17 March, despite the 
presence of baton-armed police, two cars carrying employees 
were stoned. This prompted the cars to stop, and "employee" 
Ivan Jenkins exited the car with a drawn revolver. Jenkins 
then pursued picketer John Karwacki across a snow covered 
field, and fired five gunshots at Karwacki before he 
surrendered. In a bitter tale of injustice, the man who was 
shot at was then arrested by Winnipeg police.•• 
By this point, knowledge of the strike had spread 
throughout Winnipeg. When an arrested picketer appeared 
before city of Winnipeg magistrate R.B. Graham, he received 
the maximum sentence for assault.•• In reading the 
disposition, Magistrate Graham further lectured that: 
[T]his assault was absolutely unprovoked and extremely 
brutal. By his own admission, the accused was not 
employed at the packing plant. He had no part in the 
33Winnipeg Tribune, 12 March 1934. A similarly, anti-
communist attitude was displayed in this period by Canada 
Packers management, sending out "stooges" to Communist rallies 
at Market Square to survey the onlookers. Any Canada Packer 
worker in attendance at such a meeting would later be 
suspended or fired. Interview with Maurice Yeo by John 
Grover, Winnipeg, 1994. 
34Voice of Labour, 5 April 1934. 
35At the trial, crown evidence revealed that the city had 
planted spies in the picket lines. Winnipeg Free Press, 22 
March 1934. 
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labour troUble nor did he have any grievance against 
employees or officials of the firlll. He came there 
simply to cause and foment trouble, and in imposing 
only a year's sentence, I am acting very leniently.•• 
The same day, the city's anti-Communist Mayor, Colonel Ralph 
Webb promised to meet Kobold and resolve the matter within two 
In spite of Webb's failed promise and the recent harsh 
sentences from city courts, picket line violence continued and 
another replacement worker was "brutally beaten" by 
picketers.» Faced with the near death of one of its members -
in plain face of a hostile police force, and court system 
the FWIU could count few allies. The iinnipeg Free Press and 
the Winnipeg Tribune both revealed an anti-strike attitude 
through their selective reporting and violent description of 
the strike." As a result of this situation, the FWIU adopted 
a new tactic of pUblicizing the strike. 
On 4 April 1934, the FWIU organized a massive show of 
support in which 2,000 Winnipeggers demonstrated in front of 
"'Winnipeg Free Press, 22 March 1934. 
•~colonel Ralph Webb, a former army colonel and Winnipeg 
capitalist, was infamous for his hatred of Communists and his 
anti-Communist actions" Webb, was re-elected Mayor in 
campaigning under the slogan, "Raise Hail Columbia with the 
Reds", and added that all the "Reds" in Winnipeg should be 
dumped into the Red River. Betcherlllan, The Little Band, p.96, 
146 • 
.. '"Winnipeg Free Press, 27 March 1934. 
"Instead of detailing both sides of the strike or worker 
demands, attention focused on the company's misfortune, the 
communist element of the FWIU, and on picketline violence. 
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the Western Packing plant. The size of this demonstration 
displayed the strength and support of Winnipeg's working 
class community for the strikers and the union. Communist 
Alderman, and FWIU General Secretary, Jacob Penner, and 
School Trustee Andrew Bilecki, addressed the participants, 
who then marched in a parade led by "red kerchiefed singing, 
young pioneer children. 1140 New support also came from the 
April 1934 debut of voice of Labour." 
At a City of Winnipeg Council meeting on 12 April, 
Alderman Jacob Penner introduced a motion condemning the 
conditions at the western Packing Company. However, in the 
highly stratified era of Winnipeg city politics, Mayor Webb 
and his ideological counterparts defeated the motion.•• In 
response, the FWIU organized a highly visible protest march 
down Portage Avenue. Winnipeg police added reserve squads 
for the protest, but could do little against the peaceful 
demonstrators. Unable to disperse the law abiding 
protesters, the police had to content themselves by 
arresting one of those protesters 
"'The Pioneers was a children's communist group, named 
after a similar organization in the Soviet Union. Voice of 
Lab9ur, 5 April 1934. 
41The voice of LAboUr's first headline pleaded, "Help 
western Packing Strikers Win!" The paper also stressed the 
efforts of the FWIU and the WUL, revealing that the union 
had given relief to the families of nine strikers, and 
assisted in the release of those arrested. voice of Labour, 
5 April 1934. 
""voice of Labour, 12 April 1934. 
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involved for placing defamatory stickers on store windows that 
sold Western Packing's meat ... 
A small victory for the workers occurred when Attorney 
General W.J. Major offered his services as a mediator.•• No 
doubt embarrassed by the strike's violence and the sight of a 
mass of working class demonstrators on Winnipeg's main street, 
Major offered to mediate the strike. •5 Major's offer was, 
however, conditional that the strikers lay down their pickets 
before mediation could begin.•• 
The strikers responded that they had been ready to 
negotiate from the first day, but that: 
We have a legal right to picket and to give up that 
leqal riqht ••• would leave ~s entirely helpless •••• we 
are particularly reluctant to abandon our strike 
struggle on a mere promise ••• [however] we are ready to 
negotiate. •7 
"''Winnipeg Free Press, 18 April 1934 • 
.. Ironically, as Major offered to mediate, the Mayor of 
Winnipeg was delivering a speech on the evils of Communism. 
Webb's speech talked of how Communists were taking advantage 
of the economic depression and unemployment, and were 
fermenting discontent, trouble and rebellion - rebellion which 
Webb alleged came directly from Moscow. Winnipeg Tribune, 20 
April 1934. 
"'The gravity of the western Packing strike was revealed 
through the provincial government's offer to mediate. In the 
previous ten years, the government had only offered to 
intervene in a labour dispute once. Winnipeg Tribune, 18 
April 1934, 
•"Voice of Labour, 19 April 1934. 
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"0eclaration Of the Strike Committee", in voice of 
Labour, 19 April 1934. 
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Perhaps encouraged by these events, Major withdrew his 
original stipulation and agreed to negotiate. The Attorney-
General proposed a respectable wage increase and other 
improvements for the workers; however, he stopped short on 
union recognition. Instead, he suggested a rather utopian 
scenario by which the company would listen to its employees on 
any matter, at any time. Major's plan failed however to 
guarantee the rehiring of strikers, and as a result, the offer 
was rejected and talks broke down. Following the collapse of 
negotiations, a western Packing company official stated, "We 
have offered the men everything possible, gone the limit. We 
will ••• not negotiate further".•• 
In late April, the Workers Unity League took up the 
strikers' cause directly, and Jacob Penner and L. Vassil.gave 
speeches at a mass meeting. Later that night, perhaps 
inspired by the speeches, picketers attacked the homes of 
replacement workers. 49 Further support for the striking 
workers came on May Day, when a parade of 3, 000 to 6, 000 
people, led by Penner and Andrew Bilecki, marched behind a 
banner which originally read, "Support the Heroic Western 
Packing Company Strikers.""° 
41
'Winnipeg free Press, 27 April 1934. 
"''Winnipeg Tribune, 29 April 1934. 
""Despite the fact that on l May 1934, there existed an 
extremely volatile situation, there were no major 
disturbances. The only conflict occurred when Winnipeg 
police, who were reinforced by "special detachments" on every 
corner of the parade route, would not allow a banner reading 
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Despite strong support from the community, the length of 
the strike was beginning to take its toll on strikers. 
Economic hardships had forced the FWIU to hold yet another 
collection to help support the strikers. The financial 
situation became clear through the strikers' changing demands. 
Dropping the demand for union recognition, the union now 
concentrated on getting strikers back to their jobs." 
The final blow for the strikers came when the majority of 
the Winnipeg city council, acting for the benefit of the 
company and capitalism, attempted to disrupt the mass 
picketing and weaken the community support. This move came in 
the form of a decision by the Civic Unemployment Committee, 
which declared that: 
[M]en who are on picket and who are found acting as 
pickets, or taking active part in strikes in which 
they are not individually concerned, will be 
considered as being at work and will be struck off 
relief .sa 
"Support the Heroic Western Packing company Strikers". A 
quick-thinking demonstrator cut out a section of the banner, 
so that the slogan simply read "Western Packing Company 
Strikers". Winnipeg Tribune, May 2 1934 and Winnipeg Free 
Press, 2 May 1934. 
"Tropak stated that, "The company proposed that part of 
the new employees engaged during the strike be retained in 
employment while part of the old employees be left on the 
streets. To such a proposition, of course, we can never 
agree," Winnipeg Tribune, 3 May 1934. 
5
"Winnipeg Tribune, ll May 1934. 
56 
Recognizing the impossible situation in which the union now 
found itself in, on 19 May, an agreement was formally reached 
and the strike ended. 
The agreement included the same conditions proposed by 
Major nearly a month before, and added the provision that 
twenty of the strikers be hired immediately, with the 
remainder to be qradually absorbed. 5 ' While the settlement of 
the strike did advance the wages of the workers at the Western 
Packing Company, this occurred at the expense of a long and 
violent strike, which saw at least 25 picketers arrested. 54 
Furthermore, not all strikers were rehired, and workers did 
not secure their chief objective of union recognition. 
Al thouqh the FWIU did not have enough time to expand into 
Winnipeq's other meat packing plants, the threat of union 
organization prompted swift Canadian and Burns to offer their 
workers 10 per cent raises. FUrthermore, Robert watt, a former 
packinghouse foreman at Swifts, described that in 1934, the 
53Having successfully blackmailed the workers by 
threateninq to withhold relief from picketers, the same niqht 
the agreement was reached, and the strike was over, City 
council instructed the Unemployment committee to rescind its 
order which cut off relief to those engaged in strike 
activity. Voice of Labour, 24 May 1934, and Winnipeg Tribune, 
21 May 1934. 
5 4These men included: Samuel Barber, Tom Bryson, Leo 
Carson, H. Chaykowski , Freddie Chernowski , M. Chwal iboya, 
Philip Oenzeka, s. Edwardson, Karl Franczsty, Gisli Gislason, 
H. Harmachuk, Bohden Harmatiuk, William Hryciuk, John 
Karwacki, F. Klaptovic, Oshed Mag is, Anqus McDonald, J. 
Melnyk, Joseph Prodaniuk, George Roqers, Harry Szarkowski, 
Michael Teremkiv, John Tropek, and John Yaremkiw. The 
majority of these men have Slavic names, reflecting the hiqh 
percentage of Ukrainians in the packinghouse industry. 
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company received word that a union was going to come down to 
the plant and try to organize it. Although Watt remembered 
the union as the International Workers of the World (the 
"Wobblies"), it is likely that this was in fact the FWIU. 
What is equally interesting was Swift's response to the 
situation - all of SWift's foremen were sent up to the roof 
armed with shotguns and the plant gates were blockaded."" 
Notwithstanding the enormous personal cost of the strike, 
for a generation df Winnipeg meat packing workers not familiar 
with industrial unionism, the Western Packing strike 
demonstrated the hostile attitude of the government and 
management to organized labour, and invoked a sense of 
confidence in collective action among workers. Finally, 
because of unparalleled efforts in organizing workers in the 
1930s, Communist efforts convinced Winnipeg workers that their 
collective future lay in industrial unionism and provided a 
valuable link to the successful organization of Canada Packers 
in 1943. 
""Interview Robert watts, by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985, 
Meat Packing Industry Oral History Project Provincial Archives 
of Manitoba. 
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Chapter Four 
Attacking the citadel: 
The 1943 PWOC victory at Canada Packers 
The experience at Western Packing in 1934 provided a 
valuable lesson for Winnipeg packinghouse workers and future 
organizational efforts. The organizing pattern used at 
Western Packing exemplified the first instance inthe Winnipeg 
meat packing· industry of industrial unionism. Moreover, the 
support and relative strength of the Western Packing local 
demonstrated the necessity of vertical industrial unionism, 
and suggested an optimistic, albeit difficult future for union 
organization and collective bargaining in the Winnipeg meat 
packing industry. 
The optimism and idealism of industrial unionism did not 
materialize in Winnipeg for nearly ten years following the 
Western Packing experience. Due to a lack of leadership from 
organized labour, and unfavourable local and national 
conditions, unionism disappeared from Winnipeg meat packing 
plants until 1943. 
During the period from 1934 until 1943, continued harsh 
working conditions reiterated the need for collective action 
. among workers. Winnipeg packinghouse workers remained poorly 
paid, discriminated against and without bargaining power. 
Within ten years however, the atmosphere in Winnipeg improved 
and proved fertile for successful union organization, 
recognition and the securement of collective bargaining. 
Changed local conditions, including the recent reorganization 
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of work, proven failure of craft unionism and appeal of 
industrial unionism, combined with an overall strengthening of 
the labour movement and World War II to create an environment 
in whi.ch pro-union workers at Canada Packers successfully 
secured unionism in Winnipeg. 
Following the defeated strike at Western Packers in 1934, 
Western Packers workers remai.ned committed to collective 
action and the Food Workers International Union (FWIU) local 
continued. Eventually, however, the local crumbled and the 
1934 experiment ended. The death of the FWIU did not directly 
occur as a result of a lack of worker support or through 
events in Winnipeg. Rather the temporary cessation of 
unionism came as a direct result of international directives. 
In 1935, the Communist International dictated a worldwide 
order to its national subordinates regarding official 
Communist policy concerning unionism. To fight the growing 
rise of fascism in the world, the International abandoned its 
policy of revolutionary unionism, and directed its 
constituents to affiliate with mainstream labour 
organizations. 1 This policy forced a great change in Canadian 
organized labour. The Communist Workers' Unity League 
directed 30 locals throughout Canada, including six FWIU 
locals in the meat packing industry packinghouse. Following 
the order by the Communist International, 28 of the 30 locals, 
1Tim Buck, Thirty Years 1922-1952: The Story of the 
Communist Movement in Canada (Toronto: Progressive Books, 
1952), pp.119-120. 
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·: -,, 
including all six meat packing locals merged with the 
conservative Canadian Trades and Labour Congress (TLC). 2 
This international directive and resulting merger created 
serious administrative problems for workers and organized 
labour in the meat,packing industry. The primary difficulty 
centred on whether or not the conservative craft unions of the 
TLC would absorb the industrial unionism of the FWIU and 
continue organizational action. At the 1936 annual convention 
of the Canadian TLC, ironically held in Winnipeg, heated 
debates occurred over this issue. While union activists from 
across the country argued that packinghouse workers were eager 
to unionize and the meat packing industry was a fertile 
ground, the conservative hierarchy of the TLC and its 
affiliated craft unions refused to offer packinghouse workers 
further organizational support. Although the former FWIU 
locals in Winnipeg, New Westminster, Vancouver, Toronto, 
Stratford, and Montreal received status as federal unions, 
this represented only a minor concession since the locals 
received little direction or support and soon lost most of 
their membership.3 
20nly two of the WUL locals were not absorbed by other 
union movements by the end of 1935. Canada, Department ·of 
Labour, Labour Organization (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1935), 
p.140. 
3In 1934, the TLC passed a motion which allowed the 
admission of industrially-based unions into their ranks as 
federal unions. Canada, Labour organization in Canada, 1934, 
p.22. Consequently, in 1936, the FWIU local in Winnipeg 
realigned with the TLC as the Butchers and Meat. Packers 
Federal Union, Number 97. 
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The vast majority of Winnipeg's meat packing industry 
belonged to a larger organization, controlled by national and 
international firms.- This structure necessitated a national 
dimension to any successful labour relations. Thus, in order 
for significant improvement in Winnipeg working conditions to 
occur, compliance and acceptance on a national level was 
crucial. A desperate plea from a Vancouver union official to 
the President of the TLC in 1938 for the creation of a 
national body and organizational support in the meat packing 
industry received the response: 
[I]t is not possible, at this time to give effect to 
the request contained in the resolution that the 
Congress initiate a national organization campaign on 
behalf of butcher workmen and packing house 
employees. 4 
Since the TLC refused to offer any direction or support in 
organizing industrial unions in meat packing plants, by 1938 
the ineffective packinghouse locals across Canada had lost 
most of their members and support, and existed in name only. 
Worker dissatisfaction with the Canadian TLC was part of 
a general questioning of the effectiveness of craft unionism 
in North America, and was reinforced by the growing success of 
industrial unions in the United States. Three years earlier, 
organized labour in the United states formally divided on this 
issue. At the 1935 annual convention of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), a majority of delegates voted 
4Letter Tom Moire to Percy Bengough, 31March1938, in 
Canadian Labour Congress Papers, National Archives of Canada, 
volume 4, file 8. 
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against adopting a policy industrial unionism, despite strong 
opposition from groups including the Amalgamated Meat Cutters 
and Butcher Worlonen. 5 As a result of this decision, a schism 
among organized labour occurred and a group of pro industrial 
union leaders formed the Committee for Industrial Organization 
(CIO) and began to organize all workers regardless of skill. 
Although the CIO sought to "encourage and promote 
organization of all workers in the mass-production and 
unorganized industries", they originally intended their 
organization to affiliate with the AFL. 6 Consequently, this 
attitude led union representative John Brophy to advise a 
group of Minnesota packinghouse workers who applied for a CIO 
charter that: 
[T]he CIO cannot grant permission to your body to act 
as a CIO group organizing packing house workers as 
this would be contrary to CIO policy. Our advice is 
that you affiliate with the Amalgamated Meat cutters 
and Butcher Worlonen and work out your problems with 
them as this organization favours industrial 
unionism. 7 
Despite such early camaraderie between the AFL and the 
CIO, conflicts soon emerged over organizational jurisdictions. 
Conflicts led to division and following organizational 
victories in the steel and auto industries, the CIO launched 
5For more on the debate over industrial unionism and the 
1935 split, see: Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the 
AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement. 1935-1941 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
6Jack Williams, The story of Canada's Unions (Toronto: 
J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1975), p.157. 
7Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL, p.352. 
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organizational drives in American meat packing plants in 1937. 
The presence of CIO organizers · in American packinghouses 
strained a previously amiable relationship between the 
Amalgamated Meat cutters and Butcher workmen and the CIO, and 
led a somewhat shocked President of the Amalgamated Meat 
cutters and Butche.r Workmen to declare in April 1937: 
I don't feel that the activity of the CIO 
representatives within the field of our own 
International Union is being carried on with the full 
knowledge of the Washington headquarters of the 
Committee for Industrial organization. We can't 
imagine that 1ou would make an already hard road 
harder for us. 
The displeasure of the Amalgamated with the CIO was 
confirmed at a national level, when, at the 1937 AFL 
convention, delegates voted overwhelmingly to revoke the 
charters of all CIO-affiliated unions. Following the official 
expulsion of the CIO unions from the AFL, the CIO increased 
its organizational ventures and in October 1937 a delegation 
of Chicago packinghouse workers formed the CIO-affiliated 
Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC), devoting 
itself to organizing all workers in American meat packing 
plants. 9 
8Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL, pp.352-353. 
9Included in the delegation was Stella Nowicki, who later 
claimed that the concept was a Communist Party initiative. 
For more information on the creation of PWOC, see: Stella 
Nowicki, "Back of the Yards." in Alice and Staughton Lynd, 
eds. Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working Class 
Organizers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973) and Lizabeth Cohen, 
Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago. 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.297. 
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Although PWOC had not yet entered Canada, in September 
1940, workers at the Toronto plants of Canada Packers, Swift 
Canadian and the Toronto Packing Company applied for, and 
received PWOC charters. CIO officials realized a strong 
demand and opportunity for worker organization in the Canadian 
industry and promptly hired C.H. Millard of the steel Workers 
Organizing Committee and Fred Dowling, the labour editor of 
the Ontario CCF newspaper The New Commonwealth, to 
organizational duties for the Canadian district of PWOc. 10 
The action by PWOC, combined with a proven desire by 
Canadian packinghouse workers to support organization, most 
likely led to the Canadian TLC's revival of interest in the 
industry. In May 1940, the TLC announced that Carl Berg, its 
Western vice-president would head an organizational drive for 
the newly created, TLC-affiliated industrial union, the 
Packinghouse Butchers and Allied Food Workers' Union. 11 
111While canadian workers undoubtedly supported industrial 
unionism, following a CIO investigation of the Toronto locals, 
affiliation was withdrawn in September 1940. Investigation 
revealed that one of the locals consisted exclusively of 
Communist Party members, most of whom did not even work in the 
industry (including the editor of the Communist newspaper the 
Daily Clarion, Mike Fenwick) • The other repealed local 
consisted of a representation of poultry buyers and management 
who joined in hopes of being able to influence their workers 
to accept poor working conditions and low wages. Fred 
Dowling, speech, "Origins of Canadian Section of United 
Packinghouse Workers of America", in United Packinghouse Food 
and Allied Workers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, box 
430, folder 9. 
11H.A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development 
and Functioning (Toronto: MacMillan, 1948), p.271. 
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The TLC drive initially focused on Winnipeg and 
subsequently Western canada. 12 When Carl Berg, the well-known 
TLC organizer came to Winnipeg in late 1940 and early 1941, he 
cast an imposing f iqure on the packinghouse workers of 
Winnipeg. Canada Packers worker Maurice Yeo, remembered Berg 
as a "big man - sharp dressed, big blue suit, a big chain 
across the chest [and] an homburg hat and a pipe. " 13 In 
Winnipeg, Berg promoted industrial packinghouse unionism in 
plants of the Big Three - Canada Packers, Swift Canadian and 
Burns. The presence of an organized body encouraged many pro-
union packinghouse workers to join and support the local. 
However, shortly after many workers signed up into the TLC 
local, the campaign ended abruptly. 
Winnipeg packinghouse workers who signed with the local 
never received an official explanation for the abandonment of 
the organization. This mysterious event led Winnipeg workers 
to speculate that Berg had been bought off by the companies, 
or that the campaign ended since management spies had 
intimidated.workers enough workers to withdraw support - both 
theories demonstrating Winnipeg packinghouse workers deep 
suspicion and distrust of management. 14 While these theories 
12one can speculate that this occurred because of 
Winnipeg's status as a major meat packing centre with a strong 
tradition of union support, and since PWOC activities focused 
in eastern Canada. 
13Interview Maurice Yeo by John Grover, Winnipeg, 1994. 
14Interview Henry Baker and Joseph H. Wilford by Bryan 
Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985 Meat Packing Oral History Project, 
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mig;ht have been contributing; factors, the abandomnent was also 
a result of the TLC administration, which decided at its 1941 
convention to withdraw all financial support from packinghouse 
organization. 15 
The refusal of the TLC to finance packinghouse 
organization, and the perceived unseediness of TLC organizers 
by Winnipeg; workers smoothed the path for organization by the 
PWOC - a point obvious to the union's administrators. In 
August 1941, Canadian director C.H. Millard .wrote the 
International Chairman of PWOC that "We urgently need another 
organizer here ••• and in the Canadian West (Winnipeg) 11 • 16 When 
PWOC officials in Chicago replied that the union could not 
afford such a westward expansion, Millard appealed directly to 
Allen Haywood, the CIO's Director of Organization for 
organizational support in western canada. 17 
EVentually, Millard's pleas to CIO officials were 
successful, and in March 1942, Fred Dowling arrived in 
Provincial 
Archives of Manitoba; and interview Maurice Yeo by John 
Grover, Winnipeg, 1994. 
15Georqe Sayers Bains, The united Packinghouse, Food and 
Allied Workers: Its Deyelopment. Structure. collective 
Bargaining and Future. with particular reference to Canada 
(University of Manitoba: unpublished MA thesis, 1964), p.78. 
16C.H. Millard to J.C. Lewis, 8 August 1941, United 
Packinghouse Food and. Allied Workers Papers, box s, folder 1. 
17c.H. Millard to Allan Haywood, 9 January 1942. United. 
Fackinghgµse Food and. Allied. Workers Papers, box 8, folder 1. 
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W~nnipeq. Dowlinq's visit prompted the PWOC's newspaper, the 
Packinghouse Worker, to comment: 
[I]t is not surprisinq to hear that they are now tacklinq 
Winnipeq ••• the key to the entire industry in Canada, and 
for so many years the citadel of packinqhouse anti 
unionism. 18 
Althouqh Dowlinq's visit did not immediately result in the 
commencement of orqanizational efforts in Winnipeq, a 
qroundwork for future developments was set. Furthermore, 
shortly after Dowlinq's visit, worker support for union 
orqanization qrew despite the Winnipeq industry's stronq, 
historic anti unionism. 
By the end of 1942, PWOC counted 2,103 Canadian members, 
althouqh Winnipeq remained unorqanized. 19 In addition to an 
overall strenqtheninq of the labour movement, of key 
importance to the success of orqanized labour was the impact 
of World War II on the industry and Canadian labour. 
Canada's declaration of war on Germany drastically 
chanqed the face of the Canadian economy. In 1939, the meat 
packinq industry ranked as Canada's third larqest industry, 
and enjoyed its twelfth consecutive year as Manitoba's larqest 
18Packinghouse Worker, 3 April 1942 •. Such mention of 
Winnipeg is remarkable, given the fact that attention to 
Canadian affairs occurred in the Packinghouse Worker a mere 19 
times in 1942. 
1\Jnited Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers Papers, box 
495, folder 15. 
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industry. 20 The war boosted nearly all areas of the Canadian 
economy, and specifically increased the demand for meat and 
canned meat. During the war, Canadian exports of canned meats 
tripled from 6,377,972 pounds (worth $782,364) in 1940, to 
18,819,576 pounds (worth $5,052,065) in 1943.21 Following 
this, the profits of the Big Three also increased steadily 
during the period: 22 
year 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
Big Three Profits 
$1,671,935 
$1,872,766 
$1,915,880 
$2,864,683 
$2,956,786 
During the war, Winnipeg plants expanded to meet the 
growing demand and created new jobs at an unprecedented rate. 
Similar expansions occurred in many other Manitoban 
industries, and by 1941 the province of Manitoba had achieved 
full employment. 23 For meat packing companies, the labour 
shortage created an industry desperate for workers. Burns' 
foreman Earl Cockle hired university students and even 
travelled to Churchill, Manitoba, to recruit "everyone we 
could get our hands on", while on occasion Canada Packers 
20canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Yearbook 
(Ottawa: King's Printer, 1925-39). 
21canada, Department of Agriculture, Annual Market Review 
(ottawa: King's Printer), 1939-1943. 
22unite4 Packinahpµse Food and Allied workers Papers, box 
482, folder 13. 
230ouq Smith, Let Us Rise! A History of the Manitoba 
I.abour Moyement (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1985), p.98. 
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bused in up to 200 off-duty soldiers at night to work. 24 When 
these actions did not prove sufficient to meet the demand for 
workers, the companies began to hire women workers. 
Shortly following the outbreak of world War II, companies 
were forced to return to female labour to fill a "manpower" 
shortage. 25 Although assigned to "female" departments such as 
bacon slicing / packing, wiener production, canning and sausage 
making, as the war continued, women quickly assumed positions 
in every department. 26 Eventually, female labour reached the 
highly important jobs of the beef killing floor and welding 
shop, where some claimed they did a better job because of 
their "feminine touch11 • 27 However, although women now worked 
in all departments of packinghouses, their wages still did not 
equal those of the men. 
As the wartime need for meat reached new levels, the 
widespread use of female labour aided in doubling the number 
of packinghouse workers in Manitoba between 1939 and 1943. 28 
24Interview Earl Cockle and Ronald Matthewson by Bryan 
Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
~is phenomenon was not restricted to the meat packing 
industry. During the War, the number of women unionists grew ' 
considerably. For example, from 1941 to 1942, the number of 
women unionists grew from 30,327 to 51,383 - an increase of 
almost 70%. 
Canada, Labour Organizations in Canada, 1942, p.23. 
26rnterview with Ronald Matthewson and Joseph H. Wilford 
by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
27Interview Maurice Yeo by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
28Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1939-1943. 
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Additionally, due to wartime demand, the meat packing industry 
emerged in 1943 with record profits. At the centre of 
Canada's prosperous meat packing industry was the city of 
Winnipeg, which possessed the two larqest and most modern meat 
packing plants in Canada, and boasted the nation's largest 
stock yards. such factors allowed the workers toiling inside 
Winnipeg's packinghouses to emerge in a position of supply-
and-demand induced power previously unknown, and ultimately 
contributed towards Winnipeg workers being able to 
successfully "tackle ••• the citadel" in their path towards 
union recognition and collective bargaining.~ 
On 20 January 1943, Adam Borsk - a former Canada Packers 
employee in Toronto - was sent by PWOC to organize Winnipeg 
packinghouse workers. 30 Union strategy held that the key to 
Winnipeg was to target Winnipeg's largest meat packing plant, 
Canada Packers. Upon arrival, the PWOC organizer quickly 
~Buoyed by the confidence that accompanied full 
employment was massive protest nationwide. In 1943, one in 
three Canadian unionists went on strike. Wayne Roberts and 
John Bullen, "A Heritage of Hope and Struggle: Workers, Unions 
and Politics in Canada, 1930-1982.", in Kodern Canada 1930s-
1980s, M.S. Cross and G.s. Kealy, eds. (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1984), p.116. ' 
30Adam Borsk was an aggressive vocal union organizer who 
had worked for years as a meat cutter at Canada Packers' 
Toronto plant. 
Although he had never previously worked as a union organizer, 
he held the distinction of being personally fired by company 
president J.S. McLean for his role in organizing the Toronto 
plant. These attributes, collibined with Borsk's Ukrainian 
background, made him a popular figure with the Winnipeg 
workers and encouraged the organization of many workers. 
Interview Maurice Yeo by John Grover, Winnipeg, 1994. 
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sought out Canada Packers employees Fred Billows and John 
Kolba. A meat cutter and a canner, Billows and Kolba' s names 
were supplied to Borsk by former Winnipeg workers now in 
Toronto as the two Ukrainian-Canadians were pro-union, as well 
as Communist sympathizers. 
The degree to which Communists were responsible for 
organizing the local at Canada Packers is uncertain. Although 
Billows was not a Party member, 31 he labelled himself a 
"sympathizer" and claimed that the first fifty workers to join 
the union were also Communist "sympathizers". 32 What is clear, 
however, is that many of those associated with the meat 
packing industry in 1934 were still present in 1943. As the 
Secretary General of the Canadian Communist Party Tim Buck 
generalized, "our Party had trained and developed a whole 
cadre of people who knew about unions and how to go about 
organizing them."33 
Following an initial meeting with Borsk, Billows and 
Kolba began to secretly sign up fellow workers - regardless of 
skill. To recruit members, Billows and Kolba often had to do 
little. The two unionists reminded their co-workers of the 
miserable working conditions under which they toiled and 
31 Interview with Mrs. Fred Billows by John Grover, 
Winnipeg, 1995. 
32Interview Fred Billows by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
' 33Irving Abella, Nationalism. Communism. and Canadian 
Labour: The CIO. the Communist Party. and the Canadian 
Congress of I,abour 1935-1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1973), p.125. 
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distributed union-fact sheets outside the plant gates. Union 
enthusiasts identified the irregular work, harsh discipline, 
poor wages, and dangerous work that were part of packinghouse 
life, and argued that a union was the only solution to their 
problems. Collective bargaining, they claimed would lead to 
improved working conditions, a stronger negotiating voice, and 
offered as proof from locals in Ontario and the United 
States. 34 Winnipeg union supporters echoed American PWOC 
organizer Herbert March's words: 
[T]hat there had to be unity of all workers, 
regardless of race, color, creed, nationality, skill 
or lack of skill - that only by forgetting our 
differences could we unite.~ 
The ideals of collective bargaining and a stronger 
negotiating voice appealed to Canada Packers employees and 
many joined. In less than one month, over SS Canada Packers 
employees had signed up as members of PWOC. canada Packers 
workers supported the union drive with such enthusiasm and 
zeal that Borsk was soon overextended and had to sign members 
up on Steel Workers cards. Despite inadequate supplies, 
Canada Packers workers continued to join the union, 
illustrating that the drive's success was a result of the 
workers' initiative and desire to improve working conditions, 
and not solely a result of the national union's efforts. 
34Interview Fred Billows by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
35lierbert March, Recollections of Herbert March (verbatim 
transcript of oral interview. State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin, no date), p.29. 
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By March 1943, over 562 workers belonged to the local. 
As this number represented a majority of the plant, steps were 
taken to formally direct and legitimize the local. 36 At a 
meeting on 3 March 1943 at Drewry's Hall, the workers of 
canada Packers officially received their charter as Local 216 
of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee, and elected 
an executive headed by Jack Shewchuk. Officially organized, 
the local decided to seek formal recognition from Canada 
Packers and commence contract negotiations. on behalf of 
Local 216, Borsk drafted a letter requesting Canada Packers 
general manager Joseph Harris, "to meet a committee of your 
employees and a representative of the Union for the purpose of 
arriving at a mutual agreement regarding wages, hours, working 
conditions, etc.11.37 
The day following delivery of the letter, Borsk received 
the company's reply. N.T. Sinclair, Canada Packers' office 
manager, stated that Harris had left for a vacation and that 
a definite answer would have to wait until his return on 29 
March 1943.38 Sensing a stalling technique, the local insisted 
that recognition be given or else action would be taken. 
36canada, Department of Labour, "Report· of Board in 
Dispute Between Canada Packers, Limited, St. Boniface, 
Manitoba and its Employees", p. 5 in united Food and Commercial 
Wor)ters Papers, Provincial Archives of Manitoba, box 171. 
37Adam Borsk to Joseph Harris, 3 March 1943, in United 
Food. and Commercial Worters, box 141. 
~.T. Sinclair to Borsk, 4 March 1943, United Food. and 
Commercial Workers Papers, box 141. 
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Sinclair then communicated with Canada Packers' head office in 
Toronto, and informed Borsk that the winnipeq plant was not 
qoinq to recognize the union, that all personal dealings with 
Borsk were to end, and that all future neqotiations were to be 
conducted through the plant relations committee. 39 As a result 
of Canada Packers' belliqerent actions, the executive of the 
Local 216 called a qeneral assembly on 16 March 1943. At the 
meetinq, the local decided to apply to the Department of 
Labour for a Board of Investigation and Conciliation to 
investigate the matter. 
On 29 March 1943, while awaiting a decision from the 
Department of Labour, an incident over plant cleanliness 
proved to be a crucial event in labour relations in the 
Winnipeq meat packinq industry. Havinq returned from 
vacation, General Manaqer Joseph Harris and his elder brother, 
a company vice-president, undertook an early morninq 
inspection of the plant. Durinq their tour, Joseph Harris 
noticed in the sausaqe kitchen a pile of several empty 
cartons. Embarrassed by the mess in front of his elder 
brother, Harris instructed the foreman, Req Hazel, to do 
something about it. Hazel found that an assistant sausaqe 
39canada, Department of Labour, "Report of the Board in 
Dispute Between Canada Packers, Limited st. Boniface, Manitoba 
and its Employees", p.7 in United Food and Commercial Workers 
Papers, box 171. The plant relations committee was the 
principle instrument of Canada Packers' company union. 
Although sometimes able to smooth daily operations, the 
committee had no real power and its decisions were subject to 
the company's veto. 
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maker, Angus Ross, had placed the cartons there, and suspended 
him on the spot for two weeks without pay for "poor 
workmanship". 40 
Ross, who was a union member as well as a member of the 
plant relations committee, felt unjustly punished and 
protested the suspension. He went to see plant superintendent 
Daniel Clements, but was refused a hearing. Frustrated, Ross 
then turned to the union for support - a sign to other workers 
of both the ineffectiveness of the plant relations committee 
and . of the direct growing status of the local in plant 
operations. Angus Ross sought out Maurice Yeo in the canning 
department, who, as a union member and organizer represented 
the closest thing to a union representative available. After 
hearing the details, Yeo told Ross to wait in the dressing 
room until lunchtime, at which point Yeo would go to Borsk. 
Yeo explained the situation to Borsk, who then asked Yeo 
three questions. First, was Ross popular? Secondly, did Yeo 
feel the union had enough membership signed up to support any 
strike · action? Finally, Borsk asked Yeo did he think the 
"time was ripe?" Yeo answered that Ross was popular, the 
local held over so per cent of the workers, and that they 
could soon find out ·if the time was indeed "ripe". 41 Borsk 
told Yeo to return to Canada Pacers and spread the word that 
if Borsk, acting on behalf of the union, could not resolve 
4
°winnipeg Tribune, 31 March 1943. 
41Interview Maurice Yeo by Bryan Dewalt, Winnipeg, 1985. 
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the matter with management during lunchtime, they should 
refuse to return to work. Borsk also cautioned workers to put 
away all unfinished work so they could not be accused of 
wartime sabotage, and not to leave the plant since that would 
contravene wartime labour laws against wildcat strikes. 42 
When Adam Borsk presented himself to Canada Packers 
management as an agent of Local 216, he was refused reception 
or recognition. As a result, at one o'clock, when workers 
were due to return from lunch, 592 workers, from all 
departments of the plant remained in the dressing room despite 
the yelling of plant superintendent Daniel Clements to go back 
to their jobs or else vacate the building. 
The sitdown strike gained support from every department 
of Canada Packers, and included 457 (76 per cent) male 
workers, and 135 (24 per cent) female workers. 43 such strong 
support for the local prevented the plant from operating and 
shut down plant operations for the day. Given the haste of 
the situation, the overwhelming degree of support among 
workers was remarkable, especially since most workers had no 
previous experience with union structures or labour protest. 
While the suspension of Angus Ross served as a catalyst to the 
42under wartime legislation PC 7307, strikes were only 
allowed following a thirty-day advance notice and a federally-
supervised strike vote. The so-called "sitdown strike" , was 
therefore a common tactic of the CIO and labour organizations. 
43canada, Department of Labour, Preliminary Report 30 
March 1943, in Strikes and Lockout Files, T3030, vol.426, 
no.93. 
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work stoppage, this clear act of worker solidarity must be 
seen as a climactic response to years of mistreatment from 
management, and a testament of faith of the workers' faith in 
both collective action and the local. 
The same day Adam Borsk issued a statement to the 
Winnipeg media explaining the work stoppage. Borsk explained 
that the action was "a spontaneous walkout in demonstration 
against the company's refusal to take action on longstanding 
grievances at the plant. 1144 The sitdown strike also received 
coverage from the union newspaper, The Packinghouse Work!r, 
which reported how, "these timid, browbeaten souls had 
rebelled ••• [against] the meat baron 11 • 45 
With the matter still unresolved, the members of Local 
216 held a meeting at the One Big Union hall to decide upon a 
course of action. The Local resolved to resume work the next 
day subject to four conditions. In addition to the 
reinstatement of Ross and the compensation of all employees 
for loss of time, the local insisted upon the establishment of 
an adequate arbitration board dispose of grievances - not the 
plant relations committee - and the immediate commencement of 
negotiations in regard to a vote for union recognition." The 
meeting concluded with the local executive instructing Borst 
~innipeg Tribune, 29 March 1943. 
45The fackinghouse warker, 23 April 1943. 
"'"submission of Local 216, UPWA to Board of Conciliation 
and Investigation re. Canada Packers Limited, l May 1943", in 
United Food and commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
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to contact 
management 
recognition 
Joseph Harris and arrange a meeting between 
and the union officials to discuss union 
and a variety of employee grievances. The 
adoption of return to work conditions marked the first 
instance of concrete dealings between the local and Canada 
Packers, and illustrated the democratic and peaceful direction 
in which Winnipeg packinghouse workers chose to pursue union 
recognition and collective bargaining. 
The following day, although their conditions remained 
unchanged, work resumed, Determined to defeat the union, 
Harris belligerently claimed that such a conference was 
unnecessary and pointless. 47 Instead, management sought to 
defuse the potentially volatile situation through a closed 
meeting between plant superintendent Daniel Clements and Angus 
Ross. 
Following the meeting, 
throughout the plant in which 
Clements posted a statement 
he claimed that Ross admitted 
wrongdoing and his suspension was reduced to only half a day. 
Clements clarified that Ross' suspension occurred due to poor 
workmanship, and that Ross had not appeared for an appointment 
with him to discuss the grievance. The statement concluded 
that: 
[T]he method used on Monday was contrary to the whole 
operation of collective bargaining and your plant 
relations committee exists for this very thing. In 
addition to being a violation of our relations it was 
also a clearly illegal act. 48 
Faced with this one-sided view, Ross and the local offered a 
very different interpretation of the meeting with Clements, 
and claimed that Clements had intimidated Ross into admitting 
47
"Submission of Local 216", p. 4, United Food and 
Commercial WOrkers Papers, box 132. 
48winnipeg Tribune, 31 March 1943. 
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guilt. 49 To this end, Ross personally issued a signed 
statement which explained that he made six attempts to contact 
Clements, and that: 
I admitted the only reason I was wrong was because I 
had no empty truck to put the cartons in as I emptied 
them. If I had a truck there would have been no 
question of any wrong. I said I had done my work to 
the best of my ability ••• ! feel that I was not wrong 
and should not by penalized. 50 
The union was not prepared to let the matter drop. It 
pursued the issue with the Department of Labour and won an 
investigation into the incident. Amid renewed charges of 
union intimidation, on 2 April 1943 the federal government 
appointed industrial relations officer Harris s. Johnstone to 
explore the matter. 51 When Johnstone's efforts proved futile, 
national officers of the union approached Canada Packers' 
President J.S. McLean in Toronto to personally discuss the 
dispute. 52 When this attempt also proved for naught, the union 
threatened strike action. Faced with the threat of national 
strike action, on 17 April 1943, Canada Packers agreed with 
PWOC to submit a joint request for a Board of Conciliation and 
Investigation to rule of the issue. 
In late April, the federal government created a 
tripartite Board of Investigation and Conciliation consisting 
of University of Manitoba Commerce professor W.F. Lougheed, 
G.A. Brown of the Canadian Railway Brotherhood, and Canada 
Packers counsel E.K Williams. The Board's mandate focused on 
49winnipeq Tribune, 1 April 1943. 
5011Angus Ross' Statement of the Incident", in United Food 
and Commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
51winnipeq Tribune, 3 April 1943. 
52Letter C.H. Millard to Adam Borsk, 9 April 1943, in 
United Food and Commercial Workers Papers, p.132. 
79 
., 
investigating charges of improper conduct by Canada Packers, 
central to which was the company's refusal to recognize the 
union. 53 
On 14 July 1943, following only two meetings - one with 
Canada Packers representatives and one with Local 216 
representatives - the Board presented their findings. With 
regard to the charges of improper conduct, the Board ruled, 
"the Company in no way made any attempt to handicap or 
obstruct the employees in their Union activities". 54 As for 
the main issue of union recognition, the Board vaguely 
- concluded that " a proper approach be made to the officials of 
the Company by persons competent to conduct negotiations. 055 
Although the Board recommended that negotiations between 
Canada Packers and the workers occur, they did not specify 
whether such negotiations should be held with a plant 
relations committee or the local. Furthermore, as the Board 
ruled that no improper conduct by Canada Packers had occurred, 
it is not surprising that the local rejected the report. On 
22 July, a dissatisfied Jack Shewchuk, the President of Local 
216 president wrote federal Minister of Labour Humphrey 
Mitchell that the: 
[U]nion cannot accept the findings and recommendations 
of the Board ••• [which have] evaded the real issues 
before it, which were official union recognition and 
the right of the Union to negotiate through its chosen 
5311submission of Local 216, U.P.W.A. to Board of 
Conciliation and Investigation re Canada Packers Limited, 26 
May 1943 11 ', pp.19-20, in United Food and Commercial Workers 
Papers, box 132. 
5411Report of the Board of Conciliation and Investigation 
re Canada Packers Limited, 9 July 1943 11 , pp.19-20, United Food 
and Commercial Workers Papers, box 141. 
55
"Report of the Board of Conciliation and Investigation 
re Canada Packers Limited, 9 July 1943 11 , p.23, United Food and 
Commercial Workers Papers, box 141. 
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representatives ••• [the 
recognition. 56 
union) demands official 
Twelve days later, with no response from Mitchell and the 
company still refusing to negotiate with the union, Shewchuk 
again wrote Mitchell. Shewchuk wrote .that since Canada 
Packers still refused to negotiate with representatives of 
Local 216, "We would appreciate the assistance of your 
department ••• so that the matter at issue can be disposed of in 
a mutually satisfactory manner.n57 
Mitchell's response to the volatile situation in one of 
the largest plants of a crucial wartime industry, was to 
reappoint Johnstone to investigate the matter. Johnstone, who 
had proven ineffective earlier in the dispute, was again 
unable to bring the company and the union to an understanding. 
Consequently, on 13 August, with no other options available, 
Jack Shewchuk wrote Mitchell that since the "efforts of Mr. 
H.S. Johnstone ••• to induce the Company to recognize our Union 
and to negotiate with our representative have been abortive". 
Unsatisfied with the actions of Mitchell and the Department of 
Labour, the Local officially requested a sanctioned strike 
vote as soon as possible. 58 
56Jack Shewchuk to Humphrey Mitchell, 22 July 1943, in 
United Food and Commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
57Jack Shewchuk to Humphrey Mitchell, 3 August 1943, 
United Food and Commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
58Jack Shewchuk to Humphrey Mitchell, 13 August 1943, 
United Food and Commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
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With a sanctioned strike vote approaching, a confidential 
letter was written to the Minister of Labour by Winnipeg south 
Central Member of Parliament, Ralph Maybank. 59 The Member of 
Parliament for the Canada Packers area, Maybank wrote, "I read 
the conclusion which the Board arrived at, and, honestly, it 
sounds pretty foolish ••• I couldn't help coming to the 
conclusion that there had been some pretty clever legal 
footwork done by the company's representative", and that "I 
got the impression that there was a desire to hold back from 
giving the Union its rights". 60 Maybank concluded: 
It would be a darned serious thing if we had a strike 
in this industry. Personally, I believe if you did 
have a strike in this industry ••• you could very well 
have a general sympathetic strike in support of the 
principles. I think the whole thing could be settled 
very easily if your rep here {Johnstone) were firmly 
instructed to take a firm hand and bring this matter 
to an end.61 • 
Despite Maybank's personal plea for stronger government action 
and caution about a potential general strike, the Department 
of Labour took no action. On 29 September 1943, a federally 
supervised strike vote occurred at Canada Packers. The vote 
ballot asked: 
5\}{aybank, a former Winnipeg barrister was the Liberal 
Member of Parliament for Winnipeg South Central since 1935. 
His interest in the matter most likely was a result of the 
Stock Yards area being in his district. 
'°Ralph Maybank to H\llnphrey Mitchell, 17 September 1943, 
in United Food and Commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
61Ralph Maybank to Humphrey Mitchell, p.4, in United Food 
and Commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
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Are you in favour of going on strike if the Company 
continues to refuse to meet a committee, all members 
of which are freely chosen by the Union?62 
Canada Packers employees overwhelmingly supported strike 
action. Of the 954 workers who voted, 97 per cent (916) voted 
in favour of strike action.~ This overwhelming victory for 
the union and its pursuits occurred despite attempts by Canada 
Packers to thwart the process. Acting as counsel for the 
Local, Manitoba Member of Legislative Assembly Louis st. 
George Stubbs made five charges of improper conduct against 
the company on the day of the vote.M In a formal letter to 
Humphrey Mitchell, Stubbs stated that Canada Packers refused 
to supply the government agent with a list of its employees to 
ensure that everyone voted. Furthermore, he claimed that the 
company refused to allow the vote to take place on company 
property and refused to give employees time off to vote. 
Finally, Stubbs charged that management tried to prevent the 
vote by threatening and intimidating the workers. In one 
62Local 216, United Packinghouse Workers of America (CIO) 
and Canada Packers Limited, Statement of Union's Case, 
Winnipeg, 1943. Personal Collection of Maurice Yeo. 
~innipeq Tribune, 30 September 1943. 
MLouis st. George Stubbs had been a sympathetic working 
class and labour Winnipeg judge who was removed from the bench 
in 1929 for prejudicial conduct. Following his removal, he 
continued to practice law and was elected as a provincial 
member of legislature from 1936 until 1948. James H. Gray, 
The Winter Years: The Depression on the Prairies (Toronto: 
MacMillan, 1966), pp.93-95 and Lewis St. George Stubbs, A 
Maioritv of One: The Life and Times of Lewis St. George Stubbs 
(Winnipeg: Queenston House, 1983), pp.36-45. 
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instance, a foreman physically barred the exit to prevent 
female employees from going to vote. 65 
With the path to a strike now firmly entrenched and the 
local enjoying strong support, the National Executive of the 
union took a more active role. Perhaps seeking to establish 
a national relationship with the head office of Canada 
Packers, the UPWA encouraged negotiations instead of pursuing 
strike action. Because of this, Stubbs' charges of the illegal 
acts of the company were not vigorously pursued as the 
Canadian Director of the union, Fred Dowling, felt it might 
hinder negotiations with Canada Packers. 66 
Following the National Executive's suggestion, Jack 
Shewchuk wrote Joseph Harris stating that despite a strike 
mandate, the local remained "desirous of negotiating with the 
Company concerning rates of pay, hours of labour and other 
working conditions with a view to the conclusion of a 
collective agreement" instead of going on strike. 67 No 
response was given from either Harris or Canada Packers 
management. 
Several days later, the Winnipeg Tribune reported that 
the federal Minister of Labour had appointed Mr. Justice 
65Louis St. George Stubbs to Humphrey Mitchell, 30 
September 1943, in United Food and Commercial Workers Papers, 
box 132. 
66Fred Dowling to Adam Borsk, l October 1943, in United 
Food and Commercial Workers Papers, box 141. 
67Jack Shewchuk to Joseph Harris, 4 october 1943, United 
Food arui commercial W9rkers Papers, box 141. 
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MacPherson as industrial disputes inquiry investigator in 
order to avoid a strike in the vital wartime industry.~ The 
announcement came as a surprise to the local, which was 
unaware of the appointment. 
The Local executive perceived the appointment as an 
attempt by the government to slow and drag out the entire 
process to the benefit of the company. In response, several 
letters to Mitchell were written by Stubbs on behalf of the 
Local. On 8 October, Stubbs clarified the Local's position 
when he declared, "this announcement was entirely unexpected 
and came as a bombshell to the Union", and that in view 11of 
the developments of this dispute over the last six months, its 
effect, if not its design, is to frustrate the Union and 
stalify (sic] the Government, in an effort to appease the 
company. 1169 Stubbs added on 9 October, that the only solution 
to the matter was that the "Union must be granted its legal 
rights". The same letter closed with the warning that "The 
Union means business. It will strike. 1170 
As it appeared inevitable that a strike would occur in 
the Winnipeg plant, serious negotiations in Toronto commenced 
between the National Executive of the union and national 
officials from canada Packers. The importance of the Winnipeg 
&Bwinnipeg Tribµne, 6 October 1943. 
'9r.ouis St. George Stubbs to Humphrey Mitchell, 8 October 
1943, in United Food and, Commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
70uiuis st. George Stubbs to Humphrey Mitchell, 9 october 
1943, United Food and. Commercial Workers Papers, box 132. 
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plant to national operations and the war demand encouraged 
progress in the talks. The Canadian Director of the union, 
Fred Dowling, wrote Borsk that in "my opinion ••• a solution 
acceptable to Local 216 will be arrived at. 11 However, since 
the matter was a Winnipeg affair, Dowling reassured Borskthat 
"No action will be agreed to until it has been approved by the 
local union in Winnipeq."71 
Several days later, on 11 October, the legal counsel of 
the union in Toronto announced to the federal Minister of 
Labour that an agreement had been formally reached with Canada 
Packers and a strike prevented.n The agreement stated that 
both parties agreed to a vote which would determine whether or 
; 
not the employees wanted collective bargaining. If a simple 
majority voted in favour of Local 216, the company would 
recognize it as sole collective bargaining agent of its 
workers. 
Winnipeg workers sharply criticized the announcement of 
the agreement reached in Toronto. The apparent victory wa.s not 
warmly greeted by the membership of Local 216. Instead of 
relief and gratitude that the union would be recognized -
subject to a vote of confidence by the employees - Local 216 
officially voiced displeasure at having to submit themselves 
to a second vote of recognition, sensing that this move was an 
71Fred Dowling to Adam Borsk, 4 october 1943, United Food. 
and Commercial Papers, box 141. 
72Edward Joliffe to Humphrey Mitchell, 11October1943, 
United. Food and Commercial Workers rapers, box 132. 
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unnecessary and backward step. FUrthermore, the deal 
contradicted Dowling's message of 4 October which stated that 
no action would occur without the Local's consent. From the 
perspective of the Winnipeg Local, it appeared that a deal had 
been struck behind their back. The absence of Local 21.6 
representatives in Toronto and the local's relatively new 
association with the union furthered this sentiment.n 
The local's sense of betrayal and irritation was 
expressed in a telegram from St. George Stubbs to Deputy 
Minister of Labour A. MacNamara, which read: 
UNION REPUDIATES DOWLING DEAL WITH MCLEAN - DOWLING 
AGREED PERSONALLY AND LETTER NO ACTION WITHOUT 
APPROVAL LOCAL UNION - UNION REFUSES PART IN FARCICAL 
PROPOSED REPRESENTATION VOTE - GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED 
STRIKE VOTE DECISIVELY REPRESENTATIVE - UNION FED UP -
SITUATION APPROACHES CRISIS - EMPLOYEES' PATIENCE 
RESTRAINT OVERTAXED - UNION EXPECTS GOVERNMENT TO 
OBSERVE OWN LAWS AND COMPEL EMPLOYERS AS WELL AS 
EMPLOYEES TO OBEY THEM. 74 
For Winnipeg workers, the situation appeared to be approaching 
a crisis point. on 22 October 1943, a special general meeting 
of the local passed three resolutions, all of which reflected 
a sense of betrayal and frustration. Most significantly, the 
Local overwhelmingly passed a resolution that stated: 
[T]hat this Union rejects and repudiates the said 
agreement made by the said parties, in the 
nLocal 216 member Maurice Yeo recalled that the Local' s 
legal counsel, Louis St. George Stubbs, had vigorously 
campaigned for the Local to reject the offer. Interview with 
Maurice Yeo by John Grover, Winnipeg, 1994. 
74Louis St. Georqe Stubbs to Alan MacNamara, 13 October 
1943, Vnited Food and Commercial Workers Papers, box l.32. 
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circumstances aforesaid, and refuses to be bound or 
obliqated thereby in any way whatsoever. 75 
The turmoil brouqht an illll!lediate response from Toronto 
and the National Executive of the union. National union 
representatives Fred Dowling and C.H. Millard arrived in 
Winnipeg to personally assure the members of Local 216 they 
had not attempted to strike a private deal, and that a vote of 
confidence would be a mere detail. As a result of this 
personal assurance, in a curious turn of events, by 26 
October, the executive of Local 216 reversed its position in 
exchanqe for a key clause being added to the aqreement. 
on 26 October, Local 216 initiated a sliqht change to the 
national agreement. The principle difference between the two 
offers was that the second one took for granted that Local 216 
as sole collective barqaining agent and references to a 
possible company union dropped. At the meeting, Dowling 
assured the members that the national executive had not struck 
a deal behind the Local's back. Dowling pleaded that the new 
agreement before them and the presence of national officers in 
Winnipeg, spoke to their good intentions. These assurances,, 
and the fact that the new agreement did not contest the Local 
as sole collective bargaining agent, convinced the Local 
Executive to accept the new proposal. 
7511Minutes of General Meeting of Local 216, U.P.W.A., 22 
October 1943 11 , in united Food and Colllll!ercial Workers Papers, 
box 141. 
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These turn of events represented a victory for Loc:al 216. 
Although a second vote was necessary, the LOcal forced both 
the national executive and the company to revise their 
agreement to the Locals' desires. Following another 
successful vote of recognition, Local 216 was official 
recognized by management as the sole collective bargaining 
agent for Canada Packers workers in Winnipeg. The path 
towards collective bargaining and union recognition for 
Winnipeg workers at Canada Packers was complete. The next 
step for Winnipeg workers was to expand the union into the 
rest of the Winnipeg meat packing industry and to better 
working conditions. 
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Chapter Five 
The Expansion of Unionism 
Winnipeg's Meat Packing Workers, l.944-1947 
Following the successful union "tackle" on the Canada 
Packers "citadel" and the procurement of union recognition and 
collective bargaining in 1943, focus and organizational 
direction shifted to the remainder of Winnipeg's meat packing 
industry. As early as 1941, national union executives had 
identified the need for an organizational drive in Winnipeg. 
The low wages, harsh and dangerous working conditions, and 
authoritarian discipline faced by Winnipeg workers made the 
meat packing industry ripe for union organization. 
Following an organizational strategy that had proven 
successful in the united States, the union targeted industry 
leader Canada Packers with the expectation that a victory at 
Canada Packers would clear the path for further organization. 1 
The organizational efforts of the national office alone 
however were not decisive. Ultimately the strong support, 
dedication and belief in collective bargaining of Winnipeg 
packinghouse workers realized the successful establishment of 
unionism in the Winnipeg meat packing industry. 
The 1943 organizational victory at Canada Packers 
represented the first step in union strategy to organize all 
'In the United States, the Packinqhouse Workers 
Organizing Committee launched their first organizational drive 
in Chicago at Armour. Much like Canada Packers, Armour 
represented the largest meat packing plant in the city, and 
was seen as an industry leader by the other meat packing 
companies. 
90 
packinqhouse workers in Winnipeq. Followinq quickly on this 
success, the union moved to sign up workers in Winnipeg's 
other plants. Shortly after initial contact with Canada 
Packers workers, worker-turned-union. organizer, Adam Borsk 
began further organizational activities. Concentrating on the 
larger industry-leading firms, Borsk initially pursued 
organization at the plants of Swift Canadian and Burns, the 
remaining members of the Big Three. 
Utilizing a similar strategy to that which had been 
successfully used at Canada Packers, a nucleus of pro-union 
packinghouse workers at Swift Canadian and Burns spread the 
union message to workers. The prospect of improving the 
wretched working conditions within Winnipeg's meat packing 
plants combined with the successful example at Canada Packers, 
encouraged Swift's and Burns' workers to join and support the 
union. 
The union enjoyed success at both plants as workers 
sought to improve their working conditions. Less than one 
month following the sit down strike at Canada Packers, 
packinghouse workers at Winnipeg's second largest meat packing 
plant held a vote on worker representation. On 22 April 1943, 
506 workers - accounting for nearly 95 per cent of the total 
workforce at Swift Canadian - voted in favour of being 
represented by the union and established Local 219. 2 Workers 
at the remaining member of the Big Three also joined the union 
"The Pack.inghQUse Worker, 30 April 1943. 
91 
and by 30 July 1943, a majority of Burns' workers had joined 
the union and forced a similar vote on worker representation. 
Seeking to improve working conditions through collective 
bargaining, 334 workers, representing nearly 88 per cent of 
Burns' total workforce voted in favour of union representation 
and established Local 224. 3 
The successful establishment of locals in the Winnipeg 
plants of the Big Three represented an extremely significant 
victory for Winnipeg meat packing workers. The immense size 
and importance of these three plants can be seen by the fact 
that in 1943, 65 per cent of employment in the Canadian meat 
packing industry was found in the Big Three.• This point is 
more significant when one considers the even higher proportion 
of Big Three workers in Winnipeg. statistics taken from 1945 
revealed that close to 90 per cent of all Winnipeg meat 
packing workers held emploYJllent at Canada Packers, Swift 
Canadian and Burns.• 
Consequently, the remarkable success of unionism in 
Winnipeg's Big Three plants led to creation of the All-
Executive Council in November 1943. Designed as a forum for 
'The Packinghouse Worke~, 6 August 1943. 
'George sayers Bains I The United Paclcinghou§e . F90d and 
Allied Worters: Its Development. Structure. Collective 
Bargaining and Future . with particular reference to Canada 
(University of Manitoba: unpublished MA .thesis, 1964), p.76. 
"Canada, Department of Labour, strikes and Lockout Files, 
T47074, vol.441, number 133, 
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communication and coordination among the three locals, the 
council proved indicative of the growing power among Winnipeg 
meat packers workers. Among the early goals pursued by the 
All-Executive council was each individual local's right to 
collective bargaining and to expand organization activities 
into the remainder of Winnipeg's meat packing industry. 
Since the Winnipeg plants of Canada Packers, swift 
Canadian and Burns belonged to a larger, national structure, 
their company headquarters dictated their labour relations 
policies. Consequently, collective bargaining negotiations 
between the Winnipeg locals of PWOC and the Winnipeg plants of 
the Big Three in late 1943 and early 1944 occurred exclusively 
on a local level and on a plant-by-plant basis. Despite this, 
in their first experience at collective bargaining in 
Winnipeg, the three locals were able to secure several 
improvements in working conditions, while at the same time 
assuring recognition for the union. 
Although contract negotiations among the three locals 
occurred independently of one another, three significant 
clauses appeared in all collective agreements with the Big 
Three. First, to prevent workers from withdrawing support for 
the local, a maintenance of union membership clause was 
incorporated in all contacts. This provision stated that no 
worker need join the union as a condition of employment, but 
that all workers who voluntarily joined must maintain their 
membership during the agreement as a condition of continued 
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employment. Second, a checkoff clause was incorporated in 
order to secure and ease the collection of union membership 
fees. Under the checkoff clause, the employer was authorized 
to deduct union dues and transmit these funds directly to the 
union. Finally, all workers of the Biq Three received an 
additional premium of five cents for night work. 
As a result of the first collective barqaining 
experience, and owinq to the effect of wartime inflation, 
workers in all three Winnipeg plants received increases in 
night pay. Dangerous working conditions, lonq hours and 
discrimination were not explicitly addressed or improved by 
the first contracts. Although this exclusion may have been 
due to naivete in bargaining, the presence of wartime 
inflation and a need for increased real _wages and union 
security can not be underestimated. consequently, the fact 
that all locals insisted upon maintenance of membership and 
checkoff clauses , suggests that such union-strengtheninq 
conditions and economic securities were of paramount 
importance. 
The most pressing organizing work in the Winnipeg meat 
packing industry also was finished with the completion of 
orqanizlng Winnipeg's Big Three workers • Consequently, the 
union expanded its organizational scope to smaller plants and 
related industries. subsequent drives were eased by the 
passaqe of order-in-council PC 1003 in 1944. PC 1003 
guaranteed automatic legal recognition of a union following a 
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government-supervised vote, the eventual success of unionism 
in the Winnipeg meat packing industry was primarily a result 
of the influence of the Big Three.• As the consolidation of 
industry power lay with the companies of Canada Packers, Swift 
Canadian and Burns, the Big Three controlled policies and 
practices within the industry. Therefore, once union 
recognition and collective bargaining had been accepted by the 
Big Three, subsequent union organization and bargaining among 
Winnipeg's smaller firms occurred without dispute. 
In late 1943 and 1944, the union launched organizational 
drives in smaller meat packing plants across the city and 
province, and in related industries. Within one year of the 
organizational victories at the Big Three, and with no 
resistance from employers, packinghouse workers at Western 
Packing, st. Boniface Abattoir and the Public Abattoir had 
organized. As these plants were significantly smaller than 
those of the Big Three, their memberships combined to form 
Local 228 in 1944. 7 Later the same year, the success of the 
union in Winnipeg allowed Borsk to visit Brandon. Again in 
· "For information on the implications of the passage of PC 
1003, see: Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour 
Unrest and Indµstrial Conflict in Canada. 1900-1966 (Ottawa: 
Task Force on Labour Relations, 1968). 
'Data taken from 1945 revealed that Local 228 had 203 
meml:)ers, with the following breakdown: St. Boniface Abattoir 
- 25 members; Public Abattoir - 28 members: Western Packing 
- 150 members. Canada, Department of Labour, Strikes and 
Lockout Files, T4074, v.441, no.133. 
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Brandon, packinghouse workers realized the benefits of 
collective bargaining and organized as Local 255. 
Due to the closely related nature of cold storage plants 
with packinghouses, workers in Winnipeg's two cold storage 
plants joined the union. With the evidence of the benefits of 
collective bargaining before them, Adam aorsk and local 
organizers signed up the majority of Winnipeg cold storage 
workers so that by the end of 1944, workers at Manitoba Cold 
Storage and North star Cold Storage had organized as Local 
235. 
By the end of World War II, the vast majority of 
packinghouse workers in Manitoba were organized. This 
remarkable figure is even more astounding since only four 
years earlier, there were neither organized workers in the 
province, nor organizing bodies. The growth and success 
experienced by Winnipeg packinghouse workers were part of a 
trend throughout both Canada and the United States. By the 
end of 1943, packinghouse workers had won recognition and 
agreements in meat packing plants across Canada, and the 
nUlllber of UPWA locals in Canada increased from 21 in 1943, to 
35 by the end of 1944. • The expansion and success of the 
union also led to the replacement of the Packinghouse Workers 
Organizing committee with a new, independent union - the 
United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA). 
"Canada, Department of Labour, Lab9ur Organization in 
Canada (ottawa: Queen's Printer). 
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As in Winnipeq, the success of unionism in the meat 
packing industry throughout Canada and the United States 
during the War was breathtaking. By the end of the war in 
1945 the UPWA counted 275 locals and almost 110,000 members in 
both Canada and the United states. 11 Although these figures 
represented great achievement, nationally-based meat packing 
companies in both Canada and the United States still refused 
to negotiate with the union on a national level, preferring to 
have their companies negotiate locally. The newly-formed UPWA 
recognized this as a weakness of the union, 
conditions for packinghouse workers would 
significantly until the nationally-based 
since working 
not improve 
meat packing 
companies could be forced to negotiate a collective agreement 
on a national level. 
Negotiations for collective agreements in 1944 between 
the union and Canadian meat packing companies were influenced 
by a changed government attitude concerning labour relations. 
Faced with fears of post-War unemployment, the federal 
government's passage of PC 1003 in early 1944 marked a new era 
of labour relations. In addition to guaranteeing the legal 
right to organize and implementing a procedure to ensure union 
recognition, PC 1003 denied the right to strike during the 
life of a contract, and obligated unions and management to 
bargain in good faith. Finally, for certain industries deemed 
essential (those listed in Schedule A), PC 1003 banned all 
strikes and lockouts until after federal investigation. 12 The 
effect of PC 1003 was to create an atmosphere of labour 
relations that eased the struggle to gain union recognition 
11canada, Lab9ur organization in Canada, 1945. 
12canada, Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, 1944, 
volume 44, pp.135-143. Section 92 of the Constitution Act. 
~ gave power over labour matters to the provinces, 
therefore, with the war emergency nearly over labour relations 
in all industries except those listed in Schedule A returned 
to provincial jurisdiction. 
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and therefore allowed the union to concentrate on the pursuit 
of national negotiations, rather than fight for company 
recognition plant by plant. 
Although greatly benefitted by PC 1003, the meat packing 
industry's exclusion from Schedule A meant that disputes in 
the industry were not automatically given investigation from 
the Department of Labour. This exclusion prompted the UPWA's 
Canadian Directory of the UPWA, Fred Dowling, to ask the 
Minister of Labour whether the meat packing industry's 
omission was an "oversight" or a "mistake" •13 When the 
Department of Labour responded that the exclusion was not a 
mistake, the government sent an implicit message stating that 
meat packing was not considered an essential industry. 1 • The 
government's action, however, also eased the way for the meat 
packing industry to pursue strike action. 
With the passage of PC 1003, the issue of company 
recognition disappeared as a major concern. With legislation 
now in place which provided specific methods of gaining 
company recognition, the 1944 annual convention of the UPWA 
decided to pursue national negotiations and a master agreement 
with the Big Three. 1 • Advocates of this position argued that 
13Letter of Fred Dowling to Humphrey Mitchell, 2 March 
1944, Canadian Food and Allied Workers Papers, National 
Archives, Ottawa. 
14Letter Paul Martin to Fred Dowling, 3 March 1944, 
Canadian Food and Allied Workers Papers, National Archives, 
Ottawa. Although not included in Schedule A, the subsequent 
three years of labour relations in the meat packing industry 
were characterized by a strong interventionist role by the 
federal government, thus proving in the end, the exclusion 
mattered little. 
'"Although largely autonomous, the Canadian delegation's 
decision to pursue national negotiations was influenced by 
similar actions in the United States, where national 
negotiations had first been implemented with Armour in 1941. 
A.W. Craig, The Consequences of Provincial Jurisdiction for 
the Process of Company-Wide Collectiye Bargaining in Canada: 
A Study of the Packinghouse Industry (Cornell University: 
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the national structure of the meat packing industry demanded 
that if the union was to establish itself as a strong 
negotiator to improve the working conditions of its members 
and to obtain universal benefits for workers, it would have to 
be achieved on a national level. The union claimed that 
local negotiations were time consuming and ineffective since 
they did not allow the union to match the strength of the 
companies. 
In the summer of 1944, UPWA launched its first attempt to 
conduct national negotiations and win a single, master 
agreement for the entire industry. The process began with 
preliminary contract negotiations with the head offices of the 
Big Three in the summer of 1944. These talks ended abruptly, 
however, when representatives of the Big Three claimed that a 
master agreement was impractical, thereby stalling 
negotiations. By September 1944, with the previous year's 
contracts expiring and no progress in sight, the Director of 
the Canadian UPWA requested federal intervention in the 
matter ... 
Since the meat packing industry was not listed in 
Schedule A, the federal government informed the union that 
they could not intervene without a joint application. As the 
companies were not prepared to comply with such an 
application, the union became faced with a serious challenge 
to its position and achievements. On 5 October 1944, Dowling 
notified the Department of Labour and the Big Three that.if 
contract talks remained stalled, strike votes would be held 
across Canada, including Winnipeg. 
By 1944, the UPWA held 35 locals in Canada with 6,716 
members. 17 With such significant numbers, the lucrative 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1960), p.96. 
"Craig, p.99. 
17Canada, Labour Organization in Canada, 1945. 
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Canadian meat packing industry was vulnerable to a national 
strike. The threat of a strike had its desired effect and 
officials of the Big Three quickly met with union 
representatives. As a result of the meeting, a joint 
application requesting a special investigator emerged and a 
national strike avoided. On 15 October 1944, s.E. Richards of 
the Manitoba Court of Appeal was selected by both union and 
company representatives as Industrial Disputes Inquiry 
Commissioner for the matter.'" 
Richards held joint meetings in Toronto, between the 
national officers of the UPWA and representatives from Canada 
. Packers, Swift Canaciian and Burns which concluded with an 
agreement. However, since the meat packing industry was not 
included Schedule A, Richards was not allowed to adjudicate 
the issue of a master agreement, wages or hours. Rather, the 
3 November 1944 agreement, known as the "Richards Report", 
dealt with the relationship between the union and the 
companies. The Richards Report outlined a joint commitment by 
the union and the companies to settle all future disputes 
through negotiations, conciliations or through an established 
grievance procedure. While the Richards Report stipulated 
that all future contracts were to include a maintenance of 
membership clause, it failed to promote national negotiations 
or a master agreement, instead stating that all collective 
agreements were to be negotiated and concluded on a local 
level.'" 
The 1944 contract negotiations represented the first 
national negotiations between Canadian meat packing companies 
and organized labour. Despite this, the union received 
1
•oroer-in-COuncil PC 4020 was passed on 6 June 1941, and 
provided for the appointment of an Industrial Disputes Inquiry 
Commission to investigate industrial disputes as well as 
charges of discrimination or intimidation. 
"'Laboµr Gazette, vol.44 1944, pp.1484-1486. 
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criticism from its members for having acted with a purely 
national interest in mind. From the perspective of 
packinghouse workers, the Richards Report offered very little. 
Winnipeg workers feared that the union concluded the deal 
without their consultation and that the agreement would 
severely curb their option to pursue strike action. As a 
result, following the release of the Richards Report, the 
president of Edmonton Local 243 resigned in protest and the 
president of Moncton Local 244 threatened to resign. 20 
Perhaps because of the controversy surrounding the 
Richards Report, the national office of the UPWA used an 
incident at Canada Packers' Toronto as an illustration of the 
union's independence and militancy immediately before contract 
negotiations in 1945. The conflict in Toronto arose on 17 
July 1945 when Canada Packers employee John Reid refused to 
stop work at quitting time. Since this act violated union 
unity, the local expelled Reid and called on management to 
release Reid for failure to comply with the maintenance of 
membership clause. Canada Packers' refusal to dismiss Reid, 
led the local to charge that the company violated the Richards 
Report's maintenance of membership clause. 
When Canada Packers' 1944 collective agreement with the 
Toronto local expired in June, the local felt unrestricted by 
anti-strike legislation, and conducted a strike vote. Toronto 
workers voted overwhelmingly in favour of strike action and 
the national office of the UPWA decided to use this matter as 
a show of union militancy and seriousness. Consequently, the 
national office authorized sympathy strike votes at the Canada 
""Montague, Trade Unionism in the Canadian Meat Packina 
Industry, p.160. There was no such similar protest recorded 
on behalf of the Winnipeg locals. 
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Packers plants in 
Winnipeg. 21 
Edmonton, Vancouver, Peterborough and 
On 26 July 1945, workers, at Canada Packers' plant in st. 
Boniface voted overwhelmingly in favour of sympathy strike 
action, and the next day plant operations ceased with 1,346 
Winnipeg Canada Packers workers on strike. 22 The same evening, 
the Manitoba All-Executive Board of the UPWA unanimously 
passed a motion from the national office of the UPWA to 
support the Toronto strikers through a sympathy strike 
involving all Winnipeg locals. 2 • With the motion passed, on 
Monday 30 July a sympathy strike vote among the members of 
Winnipeg Locals 119, 224, 228, and 235 occurred. Winnipeg 
workers at all locals voted in favour of a sympathy strike, 
with the Swift and Burns' locals unanimously voting in favour 
of strike action. 2 • 
On 2 August, 1,943 Winnipeg meat packing and cold storage 
workers joined 1, 346 Canada Packers workers in a sympathy 
strike, for a total of 3,289 Winnipeg workers. 2 " The result 
of this action was that Winnipeg's meat packing industry 
21For more information on the July 1945 strike in Toronto, 
see: Montague, Trade Unionism in the Canadian Meat Packing 
Industry, and Canada, Strikes and Lockout Files. 
2211Report of the RCMP 'D' Division", in Canada, Strikes 
and Lockout Files, T4073, vol.441, No.123. 
2
•winnipeq Tribune, 28 July 1945. 
2
•Local 219 Minutes, 30 July 1945, United Food and 
Commercial Wor]cers Papers, Provincial Archives of Manitoba. 
25A breakdown of all Winnipeg workers on sympathy strike 
revealed: Canada Packers - 1,346 workers; Burns - 900 
workers; Swift Canadian - 757 workers; Western Packing - 150 
workers; Farmers Abattoir - 33 workers; Public Abattoir - 28 
workers; St. Boniface Abattoir - 25 workers; and Manitoba 
Cold Storage - 50 workers. Winnipeg Tribune, 2 August 1945. 
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completely shut down for the first time in its history.•• The 
strike grew in power when Winnipeg construction and street 
railway workers refused to cross the picket lines. 27 When told 
of the situation in Winnipeg, an elated Fred Dowling 
concluded, "if [all] the [Winnipeg] plants go out, the 
situation will be pretty close to a general strike in the meat 
packing industry! 112• 
Ultimately, however, the situation defused itself. The 
same day that the Winnipeg meat packing industry shut down, an 
agreement was reached in Toronto and work resumed in Toronto 
and Winnipeg the next day. For Winnipeg packinghouse 
workers, the one-day strike, although brief, demonstrated an 
incredible display of militancy and support for union beliefs. 
Sympathy strike action occurred by workers at Canada Packers 
plants in Edmonton, Peterborough and Vancouver, but the 
overwhelming support from Winnipeg packinghouse and cold 
storage workers was unmatched and unprecedented, and proved 
their trust and faith in collective action and the national 
office. 
Shortly after the Reid strike, the UPWA began contract 
negotiations with Burns. The union demanded a master 
agreement, with a 3 o per cent general wage increase and a 
40-hour work week. When Burns refused the principle of a 
master agreement, the UPWA announced that a national strike 
vote would take place among all Burns employees.•• Since the 
'"While workers at Canada Packers were without contract, 
workers at Swift's, Burns and many smaller Winnipeg firms were 
still under contract, and therefore violating the 1944 
Richards agreement. This prompted Elliot Wilson, chairman of 
the Manitoba Wartime Relations Board, to declare that "the 
tactics of the union ••• are absolutely wrong". Winnipeg Free 
Press, 2 August 1945. 
27The Packinghouse Worker, 31 August 1945. 
28Winnipeg Free Press, 2 August 1945. 
20Canada, Labour Gazette, November 1945, vol.45, p.1673. 
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militancy of the UPWA had _been recently displayed with the 
Reid strike, and with approximately 10,000 workers on strike 
at the Ford Motor Company in Windsor, and 7, 500 miners on 
strike in Sydney, the federal government intervened.'0 
Instead of appointing an investigator, Ottawa seized 
control of Burns plants in Prince Albert, Regina, Edmonton and 
Winnipeg and appointed J .G. Taggart, of the national Meat 
Board, as controller. The federal government's rational in 
these actions was, "to prevent ••• any interruption of meat 
shipments to Britain and other European countries". 31 This 
action quickly prompted strike votes in 13 Canada Packers and 
Swift Canadian plants across Canada. It appeared that a 
nationwide strike of Big Three workers in 1945 was inevitable. 
The union's action prompted the federal government to 
reconsider its options. Upon review, Ottawa again appointed 
S.E. Richards to resolve the matter. Richards oversaw two 
weeks of negotiations between the union and the Big Three, and 
concluded an agreement in Winnipeg on 2 November. While the 
"Winnipeg Settlement" did not include a master agreement, it 
included a standard 45-hour week and a 6.6 per cent pay raise 
for all locals. More importantly for the union, Richards 
stated that collective agreements did not have to be 
negotiated on a local level. 32 
In addition to the fact that the Winnipeg Settlement gave 
company-wide contracts, 1945 represented the first national 
negotiations in which the federal government intervened. 
Following the brief, but extremely well-supported Reid strike, 
the unity and militancy of the UPWA had been proven. 
"'Montague, Trade Unionism in the Canadian Meat Packing 
Industry, pp.180-181. 
"Department of Labour News Release, 12 October 1945, 
Canadian Labour Congress Papers, National Archives Ottawa. 
••canada, Labour Gazette, volume 45, November 1945, 
pp.1673-1674. 
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consequently, when negotiations between with the Big Three and 
the UPWA proved futile, and government actions appeared 
hostile, workers throughout Canada pursued strike action. 
Faced with this turn of events, the federal government 
intervened in the dispute, despite the fact that jurisdiction 
in the industry was legally outside their authority. While 
the settlement did not apply to the entire 
establish the pattern of company-wide 
industry, it did 
bargaining, and 
reaffirmed the national importance of the union. 
The following year, a strong international demand for 
canned meat kept profits for the Canadian meat packing 
industry in the black, and in 1946, Canada Packers' st. 
Boniface plant stayed open for 18 hours a day.•• Similarly, 
organizational drives by the union increased and resulted in 
the expansion of Canadian locals from 45 to 56. •• With 
industry profits increasing, the union again pursued a master 
agreement with the Big Three as well at an average pay 
increase of 26.6 cents an hour, a guarantee of 40 hours a 
week, and time and a half for work before or after scheduled 
hours.•5 
Preliminary negotiations between national officers of the 
union and the Big Three halted, however, when Swift officials 
refused to deal with the union on a national level. Since 
this represented the greatest challenge to the national status 
of the UPWA and the process of company wide bargaining thus 
far, international officers of the union threatened Swift 
Canadian' s American parent company. Union officials vowed 
''R.C. Bellan, Winnipeg First Century; An Economic 
History (Winnipeg; Queenston Publishing Company Ltd. , 1978) , 
p.229. 
34Canada, Labour Organizations in Canada, 1945. 
'5canada, Labour Gazette, vol.46, p.1438. 
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that unless negotiations reopened, Canadian and American 
packinghouse workers would strike.•• 
Despite the threat of an international strike, American 
officials of Swift insisted they could do nothing. With the 
War over, Ottawa remained idle and again refused to intervene. 
Consequently, on l August 1946, swift locals in Canada 
received instruction from the national office of the UPWA to 
hold strike votes.'' The same day, UPWA locals in the United 
States filed notice with the American Department of Labor that 
they intended to strike in sympathy.•• When Canadian workers 
voted overwhelmingly in favour of strike action, on 12 August 
Swift officials folded and reluctantly agreed to follow the 
lead of Canada Packers and Burns and negotiate on a company-
wide level. 
Although the union won a significant moral victory, 
negotiations with the Big Three again stalemated when Canada 
Packers and Burns' offered only a five-cents raise. Since 
this offer represented only one-fifth of the union's demand, 
negotiations broke down, 
suggested that strike 
and the union's national office 
action occur.'" Acting on the 
recommendation of national officers, strike votes were held 
and passed in plants of Canada Packers and Burns across the 
'"Montague, Trade Unionism in the Canadian Meat Packing 
Industry, p.208. 
37There is little official information regarding 
Winnipeg's role in 1946 as there are no union records extant 
for this year at the Provincial Archives of Manitoba, the 
National Archives of Canada or the State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin. 
'"Montague, Trade Unionism in the Canadian Meat Packing 
Industry, p.209. 
'"A.W. Craig, The Consegµences of Provincial Jurisdiction 
for the Process of Company-Wide Collective Bargaining in 
Canada: A Study of the Packinghouse Industry (Cornell 
University: unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1960), pp.123-124. 
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country. With the memory of the 1945 strikes still vivid, 
Canada Packers and Burns joined the UPWA in requesting for 
federal intervention. Consequently, on 20 August 1946, for 
the third time the federal government appointed S.E. Richards 
to arbitrate the dispute between Canada Packers and the UPWA.•0 
Under Richards' direction, an agreement between the two 
companies and the union called for a 10-cent an hour raise. 
During this period, however, negotiations between the union 
and Swift Canadian again broke down. Although Richards' 
mandate included swifts, the company refused third party 
intervention and jeopardized relations for the entire industry 
when a strike deadline was established for 4 October. 
Ironically, as the meat packing industry braced itself for 
another cross-Canada strike, Swift and the UPWA concluded a 
last-minute agreement only six hours before the deadline. 
While the 1946 contracts did not secure a master 
agreement for the entire industry, the negotiations saw the 
union withstand company threats and secured federal 
intervention for the third time. Finally, the pattern of 
company-wide bargaining initiated the previous year continued 
as did the national status and power of the United 
Packinghouse Workers. 
Beginning in 1944, and increasing every year, national 
negotiations between the UPWA and the Big Three dominated the 
union 1 s attention. While · this course brought great 
advancements in working conditions and power to the national 
office, it occurred at the expense of local autonomy. 
Incidents between 1946 and 1947, exemplified the union's 
changing priorities. 
""The importance of Richards to national negotiations and 
the UPWA was so great that when he died in 1950, the UPWA sent 
one wreath to his funeral and Fred Dowling personally sent 
another. Canadian Food and Allied Workers Papers, Ottawa, 
National Archives of Canada. 
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In Winnipeg during the 1946 national negotiations, 43 
beef boners at Canada Packers stopped work from 30 September 
until 2 October in protest of the change from piece work to an 
hourly wage. A second work stoppage occurred for five days 
beginning on 23 October, when 26 unorganized poultry workers 
at Swift Canadian's poultry plant went on strike to gain union 
representation and a collective agreement ... 
While these incidents were not vital to the national 
success of the UPWA, their treatment by the union showed its 
priority with a national agenda. During each of these 
disputes, union support was not offered from other 
departments, let alone the rest of the city or country. 
Rather, these incidents demonstrated that as the UPWA grew, it 
focused on national events rather than small, local disputes 
which it would have pursued earlier. 
A final example of the UPWA's new inclination became 
evident during a two-day strike of 64 workers at swift 
Canadian during January 1947. •2 While the dispute was not 
relevant to national negotiations, this incident proved 
equally important as the Toronto negotiations for the 64 
workers who stopped work in protest over the transfer of 
certain jobs. However, instead of organizing a plant, or 
citywide protest, the union did nothing. Finally, when 
Winnipeg media asked the union office to comment on the 
strike, the union was unable to do so, since it was not aware 
of the stoppage until the second day. 0 
As the UPWA increasingly pursued a national agenda, in 
1947 the face of labour relations in Canada again changed as 
41For more information on the strikes, see: Strikes and 
Lockout Files, T40484, vol.451, No.211 and T40489, vol.451, 
No.206. 
42For more information on the strike, see: strikes and 
Lockout Files, T4804, vol.453, No.6. 
0 Winnipeg Tribune, 20 January 1947. 
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the federal government reverted to its pre-War disposition. 
With the passage of Order-in-council PC 302 on 3 January 1947, 
wage determination was formally returned to the ambit of free 
collective bargaining, and industries designated as war 
industries during the War returned to provincial jurisdiction. 
For the meat packing industry this meant more restriction, as 
the federal government no longer held the power to intervene 
in labour disputes. Almost immediately the passage of this 
act prompted Fred Dowling, the Canadian Directory of the UPWA, 
to predict that this would lead to a strike in the industry.•• 
Despite the return of labour relations to the 
jurisdiction of provincial legislation, the UPWA pursued its 
demands for the 1947 contract in the same manner as first 
established in 1944. Union delegates had decided to pursue 
national compulsory check off, a 40-hour week, a wage increase 
of 15 cents, and an elimination of wage inequalities between 
and within plants.•• Significantly, the union did not seek a 
master agreement during contract negotiations during 1947, as 
it had realized the impracticality of securing such a goal. 
Although the first approach to Big Three negotiations 
occurred in July, contract talks were not opened until August 
- well after the expiration of the 1946 agreement. During 
negotiations, management of Swift Canadian claimed that a 
deliberate nationwide slowdown was underway and on 26 August 
1947, fired 13 workers in Toronto, and suspended the entire 
staff of their New Westminster plant.•• 
°Craig, The Consequences of Provincial Jurisdiction, 
p.186. 
"'Montague, Trade Unionism in the Canadian Meat Packing 
Industry, pp.224-225. 
'"United Packinghouse Workers of America, "SWift Canadian 
Company", p.l (1947), in United Packinghouse Food and Allied 
Workers Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin. 
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As a result of these belligerent actions, negotiations 
with Swift Canadian broke down, and the UPWA petitioned the 
federal government for intervention. Following the recent 
withdrawal of the federal government from labour disputes, 
however, there existed no structure for Ottawa to resolve 
these national issues. Faced with the prospect of losing the 
hard-fought practice of company-wide bargaining, the national 
office directed all Swift locals to take strike action. 
Strike votes occurred in Winnipeg and across Canada on 27 
August 1947 despite the fact that it violated many provincial 
grievance procedures. An overwhelming degree of union 
solidarity and support was demonstrated when 97 per cent of 
Swift workers nationwide voted to take strike action. The 
solidarity and support of packinghouse workers was even 
stronger in Winnipeg, where 98.3 per cent (358 of 364 workers) 
of Swift's Winnipeg workers voted in favour of strike action. 47 
Immediately following the strike votes, workers walked out, 
and picket lines went up at Swift's plants across the country. 
Coinciding with these events, on 8 September 1947, union 
negotiators rejected offers from Canada Packers and Burns.•• 
With no body to arbitrate the matter, the UPWA urged that 
strike votes occur at all Canada Packers and Burns locals. 
When workers across the country showed near unanimity in 
support of strike action, operations at eleven Canada Packers 
plants and six Burns plants stopped. The addition of striking 
Canada Packers and Burns workers raised the total number of 
Winnipeg packinghouse workers to 2, 634. •• By 10 September, 
47Canadian Labour Congress Paoers, National Archives of 
Canada, Ottawa. 
••winnipeg Tribune, 9 September 194 7. 
4
'Winnipeg Tribune, 9 October 1947. 
111 
Canada's first national meat packing strike was underway, and 
90 per cent of Canada's meat processing stopped.~ 
With the strike entering its second week, and Ottawa 
refusing to intervene in the dispute, the Premier of Ontario 
called a meeting of all provincial labour ministers. When the 
politicians were unable to agree on a common plan, however, 
each province pursued its own course of action, while Manitoba 
allowed the strike to continue. 51 
With separate provincial action intensifying, the strike 
spread to various independent locals throughout Canada. The 
solidarity of Winnipeg packinghouse workers became clear on 7 
October, when 74 workers from Local 228 at the St. Boniface 
Abattoir and the Farmers Abattoir joined the striking workers. 
The next day, another 188 workers from Local 228 at Western 
Packing and the Public Abattoir Limited also went on strike. 
The effect of these moves was that as Winnipeg workers of the 
Big Three entered their one month strike anniversary, all 
seven of Winnipeg's meat packing plants, and over 2, 896 
workers, joined them and were now also on strike, completely 
stopping production in Winnipeg's meat packing industry for 
the second time in two years. 52 
As the strike continued, the Ontario government again 
tried to reconcile matters, and on 11 October held a meeting 
between UPWA officials and Canada Packers and Burns. Despite 
the absence of swift Canadian, who refused all third party 
intervention, the meeting proved successful. The agreement 
"°Winnipeg Tribune, 13-September 1947. 
"'Canada, Department of Labour, strikes and Lockout Files, 
T4088, vol.457, no.161, and T4089, vol.457, no.161. Prince 
Edward Island seized the Charlottetown plant of Canada 
Packers, Quebec declared the strike illegal and gave an 
injunction against picketing and Saskatchewan and Alberta 
prepared to seize control of 
their affected meat packing plants. 
52Winnipeg Tribµne, 9 October 1947. 
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called for a general seven cents an hour wage increase, and 
sent all other issues to final and binding arbitration once 
Swift Canadian workers returned or agreed to the plan. 
Since officials of swift Canadian refused to follow the 
proposition, however, the strike continued. In an effort to 
resolve the deadlock, the Ontario Minister of Labour 
personally visited Swift's head office in Chicago. Despite 
meeting with Swift's American president, the mission failed 
with the parent company claiming they could do nothing.•• 
With mounting pressure to reach an agreement and the 
strike approaching its fifth week, on 18 October 1947 an 
agreement was finally reached between the UPWA and swift 
officials. Agreein9 to the union's demands, the proposal 
recognized company-wide bargaining and called for a general 
10-cent increase and incorporation of the company's sick and 
accident plant into the collective agreement.•• Once swift 
workers consented to the proposal, work resumed in Winnipeg 
and across the country on 21 October 1947. 
The same day, union officials officially accepted the 
Ontario government's proposal for Canada Packers and Burns and 
workers returned. Fifty-seven days after it started, Canada's 
largest meat packing strike was over. The final arbitration 
between Canada Packers, Burns and the UPWA was released on 29 
November 1947 and raised wages to match those at swift 
Canadian." While the arbitration did not grant a master 
agreement, it drew packinghouse workers of the Big Three into 
uniformity with one another for wages, hours and working 
"Craig, p.173. 
"'Additional increases of 2.27% were awarded to st. 
Boniface and Edmonton, while Moncton workers were given an 
additional pay increase of 3 cents an hour. Canada, Labour 
Gazette, December 1947, vol.47, p.1791. 
""Labour Gazette, December 1947, p.1793. 
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conditions and reaffirmed the challenged concept of company-
wide bargaining despite the absence of the federal government. 
The 1947 strike established industry records of 14,150 
workers on strike at 47 plants and a loss of 275,000 days, and 
displayed the UPWA's determination to maintain company-wide 
bargaining.•• Following the passage of PC 302, the federal 
government withdrew its authority to intervene in labour 
matters, thereby placing the UPWA' s hard-fought battle to gain 
company-wide bargaining in jeopardy. When swift Canadian 
directly challenged the concept of company-wide bargaining, 
the resulting strike fulfilled Fred Cowling's strike prophecy 
and Canada's longest meat packing strike occurred. While a 
master agreement was not obtained, the achievement of 
identical company-wide agreements with the Big Three 
established a precedent that lasted for the next forty years. 
The events of 1945, 1946 and 1947 also evidenced the national 
office of the UPWA's preoccupation with national negotiations, 
which came at the expense of local autonomy and local 
interests. 
~Labour Gazette, November 1947, vol.47, p.1733. 
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Chapter 6: 
Conclusion 
The meat packing industry in Winnipeg underwent a process 
of considerable change in the twentieth century. This process 
of change altered existing structures of work, labour 
relations and economics for packinghouse workers. As the 
railway connected Canada from coast to coast, Winnipeg's 
geographic location, combined with its close proximity to vast 
grazing lands, encouraged meat packing firms to establish in 
the city. In the early twentieth century, a strong national 
and international demand for meat accelerated the growth of 
the Canadian meat packing industry · and led to the 
modernization of meat packing plants. 
Originally the meat packing industry was serviced by 
small, seasonal operations. In such ventures, one highly 
skilled individual performed both the slaughter and dressing 
of meat animals. As the industry grew, it became driven by 
capitalists seeking greater profits and the expansion of their 
industry. Gradually, Winnipeg meat packing companies built 
massive new plants and introduced new methods of production to 
improve productivity and increase profits. Since the industry 
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could not be fully mechanized or automated, alternative mass 
production techniques were introduced. 
The slaughtering and dressing of animals became no longer 
performed by a highly skilled worker. Rather, this operation 
was broken down into a series of one-cut operations carried 
out by semi and unskilled labourers. In addition to assembly 
line techniques, the industry introduced a tightly controlled 
work environment in which packinghouse workers were constantly 
pushed to work faster and produce higher output levels under 
hazardous working conditions. 
By the 1930s, the Winnipeg meat packing industry was 
characterized by harsh working conditions and dangerous work, 
which was dictated by one's ethnicity and gender. Workers 
endured seasonal employment at low wages, and worked under 
dangerous conditions and authoritarian-like discipline. 
Whereas the industry had once been staffed by skilled 
craftsmen with a common skill and background, workers were now 
little more than parts of a large machine. workers held no 
skills with which to bargain and remained at the owners' 
mercy. 
As the nature of the industry began to change, so did 
packinghouse workers' response. When the first steps towards 
reorganization of work and the deskilling of labour began, 
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skilled packinghouse workers went on strike to secure their 
bargaining power and status. The continual changing nature of 
the industry and failed strikes by skilled workers' craft 
unions demonstrated the decline of the dominating presence of 
skilled workers in Winnipeg's meat packing plants. 
Faced with horrific working conditions, in 1934 Winnipeg 
packinghouse workers experimented with industrial unionism. 
With the realization that modern industry was no longer 
dominated by skilled workers, industrial unionism sought the 
organization of all workers regardless of skill. Through 
organizational action directed by the Communist Party of 
Canada's Food Workers Industrial Union, Winnipeg workers at 
Western Packing sought to improve their lot through collective 
bargaining. 
When Western Packing refused to recognize the movement or 
its leaders, a long, violent strike ensued. Although hostile 
opposition from both the company and the City of Winnipeg 
forced the strikers to return to work unorganized, the 
experience proved valuable for Winnipeg meat packing workers. 
The 1934 Strike introduced a generation of Winnipeg 
packinghouse workers to the power of industrial unionism, and 
demonstrated, both directly and indirectly, the benefits of 
collective action. Furthermore, the experience also provided 
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a link to the successful events of 1943 through personnel and 
the Communist Party. 
Due to a lack of leadership from organized labour and 
political direction, the 1934 experiment in industrial 
unionism fizzled. with no organization to unite Winnipeg 
workers, working conditions in the industry remained 
atrocious. At the same time, as a result of a general 
strengthening throughout North America of the labour movement, 
unionism grew in popularity. 
World War II's increased supply and demand placed 
Winnipeg packinghouse workers in a position of unparalleled 
bargaining power. With full employment and an accommodating 
relationship with the state, organized labour flourished. The 
Winnipeg appearance of the industrially-based Packinghouse 
Workers Organizing Committee in 1943, combined with wartime 
conditions to present an opportunity for Winnipeg workers to 
secure unionism and collective bargaining. 
Spurred by a will to improve the conditions under which 
they toiled, workers at Winnipeg's largest meat packing plant 
organized a local and pursued union recognition and collective 
bargaining. When management at Canada Packers refused to 
recognize the union, a spontaneous plant-wide sit down strike 
showed the support workers held for the union. The support 
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and enthusiasm by Winnipeg workers, combined with changed 
local conditions and wartime economics and politics, to see 
Canada Packers workers secure union organization and 
collective bargaining. 
The workers' victory at Canada Packers in turn influenced 
other Winnipeg packinghouse workers to support organizational 
drives and helped facilitate company recognition. By the end 
of 1944, the majority of Winnipeg packinghouse workers had 
organized with the union and won recognition and secured 
collective agreements. 
Similar growth and consolidation were also experienced in 
this period throughout Canada and the United States. This 
remarkable success factored in the creation of a new, 
independent packinghouse union - the United Packinghouse 
workers of America. Often using strike action, or the threat 
of strike action, the new nationally-minded union was able to 
secure federal intervention in national labour disputes 
between the union and the national companies, and eventually 
secured company-wide bargaining. 
While the achievement of national negotiations and the 
growth of the union on a national level often came at the 
expense of local interests, and workplace accidents and 
injuries remained high, the achievement of union recognition 
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in Winnipeg's meat packing industry was of great significance 
to Winnipeg meat packing workers. The benefits obtained by 
Winnipeg workers through collective bargaining are best 
presented in a comparison of working conditions prior to union 
organization, and after. 
Prior to union organization, in 1934 Winnipeg workers at 
the Western Packing plant typically worked 55 hours a week, 
without job security, overtime, breaks, vacations, or 
seniority. Workers had no elected representatives or body to 
voice grievances through, and were discriminated on terms of 
gender and race, often by authoritarian foremen. In contrast, 
following the achievement and success of industrial unionism 
and collective bargaining, by 1947, Winnipeg packinghouse 
workers worked a minimum of 37.5 hours of work a week and were 
paid overtime pay after 44 hours of work. Winnipeg 
packinghouse workers held contractually guaranteed plant-wide 
seniority, sick pay, rest periods, and eight paid statutory 
holidays throughout the year. Finally, a comparison of wage 
rates in Canadian packinghouses reveals packinghouse workers 
in 1947 were paid close to 70% more than workers in 1939. 1 
'1. Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, vol. 4 7, 
p.1850. 
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While this thesis has attempted to demonstrate the 
changing nature of work in Winnipeg's meat packing industry in 
the 1930s and 1940s and how packinghouse workers responded to 
it, there remains more research to be done in this field. To 
draw overall conclusions about the Winnipeg meat packing 
worker in the twentieth century, attention needs to be devoted 
to an overall, complete history of the meat packing industry 
and its workers from the industry's birth in the late 
nineteenth century, until the closure of the Winnipeg 
stockyards in the late 1980s. 
This thesis examined a crucial period in the 
consolidation and growth of unionism in the Winnipeg meat 
packing history, however, it was limited to a brief span of 
twenty some years. Since Winnipeg's meat packing history 
includes much both before and after this era, what is needed 
is a total history of the Winnipeg meat packing worker.' In 
this sense, future works on Winnipeg meat packing workers 
would be able to delve more fully into the neglected field of 
the workers' social and cultural history, as well as their 
response to the changing nature of the industry in the mid-
twentieth century. The net effect of such a work, would 
provide future generations with a much needed documentary of 
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Winnipeg's meat packing workers and one branch of Winnipeg's 
working class. 
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